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71 
Article  
 
The Normative Logic of Global Economic 
Governance: In Pursuit of Non-Instrumental 
Justification for the Rule of Law and Human 
Rights 
 
Kevin T. Jackson* 
INTRODUCTION 
Global economic governance régimes are frequently touted 
as providing innovative ways1 for transnational business 
enterprises, often working in collaboration2 with governments, 
international organizations, and non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs),3 to advance corporate social 
responsibility (CSR)4 and tackle social problems in developing 
 
       *  Daniel Janssen Chair, Solvay Brussels School of Economics and 
Management, Université Libre de Bruxelles (Brussels, Belgium); Professor of 
Law and Ethics, Graduate School of Business, Fordham University (New 
York, New York, United States).  
 1. See, e.g., Constantine E. Passaris, Redesigning Financial Governance 
for the New Global Economy of the 21st Century, 14:1 J. COMP. INT’L MGMT. 1, 
1-2 (2011) (calling multinational and transnational private corporations 
catalysts of globalization and arguing that global economic régimes are 
essential to the modern global economy). 
 2. See Virginia Haufler, Globalization and Industry Self-Regulation, in 
GOVERNANCE IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY: POLITICAL AUTHORITY IN TRANSITION 
226, 229–30 (Miles Kahler & David A. Lake eds., 2003) [hereinafter 
GOVERNANCE IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY] (describing the emerging system of 
governance by non-state, private sector actors alongside national and 
international regulatory systems). 
 3. See Miles Kahler & David A. Lake, Globalization and Governance, in 
GOVERNANCE IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY, supra note 2, at 1 (noting the shift from 
“public” and state governance to governance by regions, municipalities, 
supranational organizations, and private actors like multinational 
corporations and NGOs).   
 4. See Peter Gourevitch, Corporate Governance: Global Markets, 
National Politics, in GOVERNANCE IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY supra note 2, at 
305, 312–15 (arguing that corporate governance is now connected to global 
governance; mechanisms for corporate governance include market pressures, 
national regulatory systems, international institutions, treaties, legislation, 
politicians, specialized associations, and NGOs); James N. Rosenau, 
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countries.5 In pursuing these objectives, such régimes typically 
operate outside of traditional frameworks of “hard” 
international law.6 
Yet, the means employed by global governance régimes in 
the deployment of public-private power and even private 
power7 alone should be viewed from a critical perspective to 
ensure they are subject to adequate restraint. Accordingly, this 
article argues that the constraints of rule of law and of human 
rights ought to attach not only to the conduct of states and 
their agents but also to the conduct of all international 
economic participants. 
The reasons for demanding special scrutiny are simple. 
First, society cannot trust corporations to be “good”8 any more 
so than it can trust nation-states to be “good,”9 regardless of 
 
Governance in the Twenty-First Century, 1 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 13, 23 (1995) 
(suggesting that the required control mechanisms for an ever-more 
interdependent world outstrip the capacity and readiness of national 
governments, thus leading NGOs to serve as emerging actors in transnational 
governance). 
 5. DAVID VOGEL, THE MARKET FOR VIRTUE: THE POTENTIAL AND LIMITS 
OF CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 75 (2005) (improving the conditions of 
factory and agricultural workers in developing countries has become a major 
focus of contemporary corporate social responsibility (CSR) since the 1990s). 
 6. See David Vogel, Private Regulation of Global Corporate Conduct, in 
THE POLITICS OF GLOBAL REGULATION 151, 153–54 [hereinafter THE POLITICS 
OF GLOBAL REGULATION] (Walter Mattli & Ngaire Woods eds., 2009) 
(describing how multinational firms and global supply networks operate in a 
regulatory framework of “soft law” consisting of private, non-state, or market-
based standards operating outside and/or alongside the state and “hard” law). 
 7. See generally VIRGINIA HAUFLER, A PUBLIC ROLE FOR THE PRIVATE 
SECTOR: INDUSTRY SELF-REGULATION IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY (2001); Rodney 
Bruce Hall & Thomas J. Biersteker, The Emergence of Private Authority in the 
International System, in THE EMERGENCE OF PRIVATE AUTHORITY IN GLOBAL 
GOVERNANCE 3, 3–22 (Rodney Bruce Hall & Thomas J. Biersteker eds., 2002) 
(describing the growing number of non-state and private actors participating 
in international governance). 
 8. See Christine Parker, Meta-Regulation: Legal Accountability for 
Corporate Social Responsibility, in THE NEW CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY: 
CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY AND THE LAW 207, 207–08 (Doreen 
McBarnet et al. eds., 2007) [hereinafter THE NEW CORPORATE 
ACCOUNTABILITY] (referencing PHILIP SELZNICK, THE COMMUNITARIAN 
PERSUASION 101–02 (2002) and Selznick’s notion of the need for “corporate 
conscience” to ensure that businesses are held accountable and take their 
responsibilities seriously).  
 9. See generally, e.g., Eric M. Uslaner, Trust and the Economic Crisis of 
2008, 13 CORP. REPUTATION REV. (SPECIAL ISSUE) 110, 110–23 (2010) 
(explaining that the drop in public confidence in business and government 
after financial crisis was due to the perception that wealthy business people 
received inequitable, preferential treatment over ordinary Americans).  
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how noble-sounding corporations’ rhetorics are and despite the 
fact that NGOs take on roles as corporations’ invigilators. 
Indeed, while many NGOs appear well-intentioned, society 
often forgets they are special interest organizations committed 
to advancing narrow agendas. NGOs are not necessarily 
reliable guardians of the common global good.10 Second, despite 
how powerful and influential corporations, international 
organizations, NGOs, and other economic participants in global 
civil society are from a descriptive standpoint, considering 
matters from a normative standpoint leads to a demand for 
justification and legitimacy.11 Participants in economic 
governance cannot, as a matter of justice and morality, stand 
above the constraints of the rule of law.12 Nor can they escape 
responsibilities for human rights.13 Even though such actors 
may gain prominence in a descriptive and instrumental sense, 
they must be regarded as restrained in a normative and non-
instrumental sense by objective universal moral standards.14 
From a logical point of view, it is insufficient to merely 
describe, as political scientists15 and economists16 have, the 
 
 10. Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, The Governance Triangle: 
Regulatory Standards Institutions and the Shadow of the State, in THE 
POLITICS OF GLOBAL REGULATION, supra note 6, at 44, 47 (explaining that 
firms, NGOs, and other actors operate in the transnational regulatory space 
not as neutrals seeking “good governance” but as partisans pursuing their own 
special interests and values). 
 11. Anne-Marie Slaughter, Andrew S. Tulumello, & Stepan Wood, 
International Law and International Relations Theory: A New Generation of 
Interdisciplinary Scholarship, 92 AM. J. INT’L L. 367 n.86 (1998) (linking the 
concepts of normative factors, legitimacy, and justification).  
 12. See, e.g., Menno T. Kamminga, Corporate Obligations under 
International Law, 71 INT’L ASS’N REP. CONF. 1, 2 (2004) (noting that it has 
long been established that corporations have legal obligations, especially in 
areas of labor and environmental law).  
 13. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res 217 (III) A, U.N. 
Doc. A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948) (“[E]very individual and every organ of 
society, keeping this Declaration constantly in mind, shall strive by teaching 
and education to promote respect for these rights and freedoms and by 
progressive measures, national and international, to secure their universal 
and effective recognition and observance, both among the peoples of Member 
States themselves and among the peoples of territories under their 
jurisdiction.”).  
 14. BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, ON THE RULE OF LAW: HISTORY, POLITICS, 
THEORY 80–81 (2004) (referencing RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS 
SERIOUSLY (1977) and Dworkin’s notion that the rule of law consists of more 
than mere rules; it also encompasses the community’s shared overarching 
moral and political principals). 
 15. See generally THE POLITICS OF GLOBAL REGULATION, supra note 6 
(providing political perspectives on emerging global economic governance). 
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emergence of new arrangements for global economic 
governance. Their efforts in documenting, classifying, and 
providing empirical analysis of power shifts do not provide 
moral justifications or groundings of legitimacy. It is also 
insufficient, as management theorists17 have done, to propose 
innovative instrumental strategies for managing the various 
stakeholder interests at play in emerging forms of governance. 
Indeed, as one surveys relevant literature, it becomes clear that 
an instrumentalist conception dominates in many of the recent 
portrayals of “new governance” régimes.18 Such depictions are 
mainly concerned with the efficacy of international régimes or 
networks and with the question of what motivates business 
enterprises to comply with “soft law.” Generally, “soft law” is 
seen as an embodiment of corporate social responsibility or 
sustainability.19 Some writers explain this compliance in terms 
of accountability (business competitiveness, risk management 
and corporate image),20 profitability,21 club theory,22 and 
 
 16. See, e.g., Lisa L. Martin, The Leverage of Economic Theories: 
Explaining Governance in an Internationalized Industry, in GOVERNANCE IN A 
GLOBAL ECONOMY, supra note 2, at 33, 33–59 (describing globalization as the 
reduction of barriers to economic exchange and a greater mobility in economic 
integration). 
 17. See, e.g., Jonathan P. Doh & Terrence R. Guay, Corporate Social 
Responsibility, Public Policy, and NGO Activism in Europe and the United 
States: An Institutional-Stakeholder Perspective, 43 J. MGMT. STUD. 47, 47–73 
(2006) (using neo-institutional and stakeholder theory to reflect on the 
legitimacy of stakeholder causes and their effects on corporate social 
responsibility). 
 18. See e.g., Jean-Pascal Gond, Guido Palazzo, & Kunal Basu, 
Reconsidering Instrumental Corporate Social Responsibility through the Mafia 
Metaphor, 19 BUS. ETHIC Q. 57, 57–89 (2009) (using an instrumental 
perspective to critically evaluate CSR in theory and practice by considering 
the organized Italian mafia). 
 19. See VOGEL, supra note 5, at 16–47 (arguing there is a bottom line case 
for business virtue that motivates CSR); see also Simon Zadek & Alex 
McGillivray, Responsible Competitiveness: Making Sustainability Count in 
Global Markets, HARV. INT’L REV. 72, 72–77 (2008). 
 20. Simon Zadek, The Logic of Collaborative Governance: Corporate 
Responsibility, Accountability, and the Social Contract 3 (Corp. Soc. 
Responsibility Initiative, Working Paper No. 17, 2006) (framing compliance as 
a matter of business management, competitiveness, and corporate image).  
 21. VOGEL, supra note 5, at 19–24 (“Virtually all contemporary writing on 
CSR emphasizes its links to corporate profitability.”).  
 22. See generally VOLUNTARY PROGRAMS: A CLUB THEORY PERSPECTIVE 
(Matthew Potoski & Aseem Prakash eds., 2009) (suggesting that club theory 
in voluntary programs offers a compliance mechanism for holding firms 
socially responsible for their promises). 
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prisoners’ dilemma or coordination externality incentives.23 
While such studies are important, society nevertheless stands 
in need of a normative, non-instrumental justificatory approach 
to global economic governance. 
An analogy may be helpful to underscore the importance of 
a call for normative justification beyond mainly descriptive 
accounts. It is one thing to objectively report and accurately 
chronicle the rise of organized syndicates alongside of, and 
sometimes in strategic collaboration with, governmental 
structures while noting their instrumental success in 
advancing economic interests.24 However, it would be nearly 
impossible to articulate a plausible normative justification for 
the rise of organized syndicates, especially given their 
notorious disregard and contempt for the rule of law and 
human rights.25 This analogy highlights the wide gulf that can 
exist between descriptive and normative accounts of 
phenomena.  
The concepts of the rule of law on one hand and human 
rights on the other make up two of the most critical 
frameworks for understanding and articulating the legal and 
moral responsibilities of participants in today’s emerging 
transnational governance régimes. This is the case in both 
theory and in practice. The discourse of the rule of law and the 
language of human rights permeate many theories of 
international law, political theory, and scholarship in 
international economic relations.26 The formulation of corporate 
ethics codes, industry-wide regulatory standards, and 
collaborative schemes with states and NGOs are examples of 
how such discussions figure prominently into the practical 
 
 23. Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, International "Standards” and 
International Governance, 8 J. EUR. PUB. POL’Y (SPECIAL ISSUE) 345, 345–70 
(2001) (using the concept of the prisoner’s dilemma to discuss corporate 
compliance incentives). 
 24. See generally THOMAS REPETTO, AMERICAN MAFIA: A HISTORY OF ITS 
RISE TO POWER (2004) (chronicling the history of organized syndicates in 
America); Gond, Palazzo, & Basu, supra note 18.  
 25. Anup Shah, Corporations and Human Rights, GLOBAL ISSUES, 
http://www.globalissues.org/article/51/corporations-and-human-rights (last 
updated Sept. 19, 2002) (noting that with companies’ drive for profits, “there 
has often come a disregard for human rights”).  
 26. See, e.g., TAMANAHA, supra note 14, at 127–36; Terry Nardin, 
Theorising the International Rule of Law, 34 REV. INT’L STUD. 385, 401 (2008). 
See also Anthony D’Amato, Are Human Rights Good for International 
Business?, 1 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 22, 22–32 (1979); David Kinley & Junko 
Tadaki, From Talk to Walk: The Emergence of Human Rights Responsibilities 
for Corporations at International Law, 44 VA. J. INT’L L. 931, 931–1023 (2004). 
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undertakings of business enterprises.27 Practical undertakings 
also support the efforts of civil society and legal officials to 
delineate the nature and scope of the responsibilities attending 
those initiatives.28   
This article addresses the heart of these ideas. It takes an 
epistemological approach involving higher-order philosophical 
analysis and reflection providing a conceptual space for 
articulating a normative and non-instrumental foundation for 
the rule of law and human rights. 
As a logical first step, one needs to define “rule of law” and 
“human rights.” This is an epistemological problem. Are the 
schemes based upon non-instrumental moral commitment to 
law and rights, or instead divorced from the normative realm 
and driven purely by the instrumental power interests of 
transnational actors?29 This article proposes drawing upon 
concepts from the philosophy of law and relating them to key 
features of global economic governance arrangements in an 
effort to comprehend the extent of congruence with the rule of 
law and human rights taken in normative, non-instrumental 
terms. 
Unlike descriptive theory which explains how things are, 
normative theory describes how things ought to be.30 Expressed 
in terms pertaining to the global governance context, a 
normative theory is needed to guide economic participants as to 
 
 27. Doreen McBarnet, Corporate Social Responsibility Beyond Law, 
Through Law, For Law: The New Corporate Accountability, in THE NEW 
CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY, supra note 8, at 10–12 (highlighting the 
increase in corporate codes of conduct, ethics codes, and industry wide 
commitments; for example, all US Fortune 500 companies have implemented 
codes of conduct).  
 28. Lee A. Tavis, The Globalization Phenomenon and Multinational 
Corporate Developmental Responsibility, in GLOBAL CODES OF CONDUCT: AN 
IDEA WHOSE TIME HAS COME 13, 23 (Oliver F. Williams ed., 2000) [hereinafter 
GLOBAL CODES OF CONDUCT] (describing the partnership between civil sector 
regulation and private and state actors). 
 29. See, e.g., Denis G. Arnold, Transnational Corporations and the Duty to 
Respect Basic Human Rights, 20 BUS. ETHICS Q. 371, 377 (2010) (providing a 
non-instrumental moral account of transnational corporations’ commitments 
to defending human rights beyond mere strategy). 
 30. David Over, Rationality and the Normative/Descriptive Distinction, in 
BLACKWELL HANDBOOK OF JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING 3 (Derek J. 
Koehler & Nigel Harvey eds., 2004) (saying that normative theories “aim to 
tell us how we ideally should or ought to reason, make judgments, and take 
decisions. These theories, particularly formal logic, probability theory, and 
decision theory, give us rules to follow or conform to that supposedly make our 
thought rational,” while descriptive theories “try to describe how people 
actually think.”).  
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how they ought to act.31 Further, a theory may appear to be 
normative yet actually be a descriptive account, offering 
contingent directives, what Immanuel Kant termed 
“hypothetical imperatives,”32 that instruct participants in an 
instrumental fashion. These “hypothetical imperatives” tell 
participants how they should act if they wish to attain some 
particular objective. Nevertheless, a full-blooded normative 
theory attempts to provide “categorical imperatives,”33 lending 
moral direction about how participants ought to act in any case, 
that is, in a non-instrumental way.  
This article has two main sections. The first centers on the 
rule of law, while the second focuses on human rights. 
Concerning the rule of law discussion in the first section, a 
normative, non-instrumental account is achieved through the 
Kantian conception of a regulative ideal.34 Regarding the 
treatment of human rights in the second section, a normative, 
non-instrumental account is attained by way of a common 
public justification for human rights norms of business.35 Such 
understandings of rule of law and human rights respectively, it 
is argued, are best suited to provide a normative benchmark 
against which to assess particular extant régimes.   
Part A of the first section begins with an overview of 
emerging global governance régimes, indicating the ways that 
such régimes pose special problems from the standpoint of an 
international rule of law. Part B discusses accountability and 
methods for enforcement of global governance régimes. Part C 
attempts to summarize formulations of the rule of law. 
Contrasting instrumental and non-instrumental conceptions of 
law, Part C argues that whereas instrumental accounts may 
appear to lend support to decentralized and fragmented 
features of global governance, what is called for on a deeper 
level is a non-instrumental understanding of law. 
Accomplishing such an understanding requires that the rule of 
law be posited not as a descriptive constitutive notion but 
 
 31. Rodney J. Blackman, Supplemental Paper: There Is There There: 
Defending the Defenseless with Procedural Natural Law, 37 ARIZ. L. REV. 285, 
309 (citing WILLIAM FRANKENA, ETHICS 5 (1963)) (noting that normative 
theories answer problems about what is right or about what ought to be done).  
 32. See generally ROGER J. SULLIVAN, IMMANUEL KANT’S MORAL THEORY 
(1989).  
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Garth Meintjes, An International Human Rights Perspective on 
Corporate Codes, in GLOBAL CODES OF CONDUCT, supra note 28, at 83. 
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instead as a normative regulative principle. Part C concludes 
by deriving the core of this ideal from mainstream accounts of 
the rule of law.  
Part A of the second section discusses how instrumental 
justification for human rights in global governance has arisen, 
first in support of corporate social responsibility generally and 
then by extension into the human rights context from negative 
and positive “business case” justifications. Part A provides a 
discussion of the inadequacy and logical incoherence of such 
justifications. Part B shows how the deeper non-instrumental 
character of human rights is established from a common public 
and invisible law justification, in contradistinction from 
narrower instrumental justifications. 
This article concludes that gaining a philosophically 
sophisticated understanding of the rule of law and human 
rights remains a vital task because such theoretical discussions 
can and do play important roles in the contemporary discourse 
of global economic governance. The rule of law and human 
rights, concepts central to the interplay between international 
law and emerging global governance, deserve careful 
deliberation. It is important that lawyers, businesspersons, 
politicians, and citizens consider them carefully in order to 
facilitate meaningful discussions about them, the conditions 
that determine their existence, whether they are intrinsically 
valuable, and whether they constitute justifiable ideals to 
pursue in the design of an emerging world order. 
 
I. GLOBAL ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE AND THE 
RULE OF LAW 
 
A.  OVERVIEW OF EMERGING RÉGIMES 
The traditional role of “hard”36 public international law is 
being confronted by the emergence of informal regulatory 
régimes and civil society arrangements for global governance. 
Unlike traditional domestic legal régimes whose norms are 
enforced through centralized systems of sanctions, emergent 
 
 36. See Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Hard and Soft Law in 
International Governance, 54 INT’L ORG. 421, 421–56 (2000) (defining hard law 
and explaining differences between hard and soft law; in international law, 
hard law encompasses self-executing treaties or international agreements and 
customary laws that give rise to legally enforceable commitments on behalf of 
states and other subjects of international law). 
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“soft law”37 norms of global governance are akin to public 
international law in the sense that they rely on decentralized 
enforcement mechanisms. 
Unlike “hard” public international law, the enforcement 
and governance of soft law does not rest on traditional 
institutions of public authority.38 Whereas traditionally 
corporate governance was shaped by substantive law 
promulgated by governmental authority, today’s transnational 
businesses function within a new consortium of authorities.39 
Areas of authority traditionally reserved to government are 
now shared with non-state delegations.40 
Numerous accounts of emerging global governance régimes 
portray the promulgation of voluntary civil regulations as a 
manifestation of acceptance of new social contracts yielded by 
growing global societal consensus as to the proper performance, 
responsiveness, and responsibility of business enterprises.41 
Civil regulation is generated within market-based, non-state, 
and private regulatory structures. These components govern 
the behavior of transnational enterprises along with their 
global supply networks.42 
 
 37. See Hartmut Hillgenberg, A Fresh Look at Soft Law, 10 EUR. J. INT’L. 
L. 499, 499 (1999) (denoting soft law as a self-contained set of obligations 
arising out of the occasional preference of nation-states to reach non-binding 
agreements and to pattern relations to avoid application of treaty or 
customary law); Kinley & Tadaki, supra note 26, at 960 (defining soft law 
instruments as non-binding, quasi-legal instruments); Alan C. Neal, Corporate 
Social Responsibility: Governance Gain or Laissez-Faire Figleaf?, 29 COMP. 
LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 459, 464 (2008) (noting desirability of so-called soft law 
regulations as opposed to the traditional hard law regulatory approach); Mary 
Ellen O’Connell, The Role of Soft Law in a Global Order, in COMMITMENT AND 
COMPLIANCE: THE ROLE OF NON-BINDING NORMS IN THE INTERNATIONAL 
LEGAL SYSTEM 100, 109–110, 113 (Dinah Shelton ed., 2000) [hereinafter 
COMMITMENT AND COMPLIANCE] (attributing the flexibility and non-binding 
nature of soft law to its existence outside the confines of state made treaties, 
and noting that soft law allows for participants beyond nation-states and 
inter-governmental organizations).  
 38. O’Connell, supra note 37, at 110 (“Soft law can fill the gaps of a hard 
law instrument without the need for entering into laborious procedure of 
treaty amendment.”). 
 39. See Inger Ulleberg, The Role and Impact of NGOs in Capacity 
Development: From Replacing the State to Reinvigorating Education (United 
Nations Educ., Sci. & Cultural Org. and Int’l Inst. Educ. Plan.), available at 
unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0018/001869/186980e.pdf.  
 40. Id. at 8 (“As development actors, NGOs have become the main service 
providers in countries where the government is unable to fulfill its traditional 
role.”). 
 41. See Vogel, supra note 6, at 155. 
 42. See id., at 151, 153–154. 
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In global governance, civil regulations ordinarily function 
alongside nation-states rather than from within nation-states.43 
The advent of soft-law’s regulatory influence outside nations’ 
regulatory schemes has empowered transnational non-state 
actors.44 This gives the private sector a much more prominent 
public role. Private authorities have a growing role in 
transnational economic regulation.45 Corporations are now 
forming a part of an emerging global public sphere.46 
Civil regulations are not replacements for nation-states, 
but instead institute governance régimes within wider global 
structures of “social capacity and agency” where none existed 
before.47 The advent of civil regulation spells the emergence of 
a global “governance triangle” where nation-states are just one 
component of global regulatory authority.48 
The idea of governance without government first appeared 
in scholarly literature in the 1990s.49 Arising as a consequence 
of economic globalization, it signaled changes that globalization 
caused in the governance structure of international society.50 
The word “governance” began referring to self-organizing 
systems growing up alongside hierarchies and markets that 
comprise government structures.51   
Global governance refers to the expansion of the sphere of 
influence of governing structures to entities beyond nation-
states that do not have sovereign authority.52 Governance and 
government are logically distinct phenomena.53 Governance 
 
 43. See Haufler, supra note 2. 
 44. Id. at 226–27. 
 45. HAUFLER, supra note 7, at 1–5; Hall & Biersteker, supra note 7, at 4–
8.  
 46. HAUFLER, supra note 7, at 7. 
 47. John Gerard Ruggie, Reconstituting the Global Public Domain – 
Issues, Actors, and Practices, 10 EUR. J. INT’L REL. 499, 519 (2004).  
 48. Abbott & Snidal, supra note 10, at 44–50. 
 49. For an example of an early work discussing governance, see Linda 
Cornett & James A. Caporaso, “And Still It Moves:” State Interests and Social 
Forces in the European Community, in GOVERNANCE WITHOUT GOVERNMENT: 
ORDER AND CHANGE IN WORLD POLITICS 219, 228 (James N. Rosenau & Ernst-
Otto Czempiel eds., 1992) (referencing Cecchini Report and White Papers). 
 50. See generally id.  
 51. R. A. W. Rhodes, The New Governance: Governing Without 
Government, 44 POL. STUD. 652, 660 (1996).  
 52. Lawrence S. Finkelstein, What is Global Governance?, 1 GLOBAL 
GOVERNANCE, supra note 4, at 369.  
 53. Kahler & Lake, Globalization and Governance, in GOVERNANCE IN A 
GLOBAL ECONOMY, supra note 2, at 7 (defining governance as the “sum of the 
many ways individuals and institutions, public and private, manage their 
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connotes a process founded on the absence of centralized 
international governmental authority.54 “Global governance” 
can involve joint efforts of public, private, and civil-society 
organizations undertaking roles within the international realm 
that governments traditionally have assumed within the 
nation-state.55 “Governance” is taken in a “public” sense to 
mean that which government does.56 Although global 
governance is undertaken by a variety of private and public 
actors across the spectrum of civil society, it is the “public” 
character underlying the idea of governance that relates to this 
article’s inquiry about whether and to what extent global 
governance takes place under the color of rule of law. A demand 
for justification is insistent given that global governance 
presumes to deal authoritatively with international human 
rights, which traditionally have been juridical concepts resting 
at the core of the rule of law.57   
 
1. Varieties of Global Civil Regulations 
The growth of CSR has brought about novel global 
governance mechanisms and business civil regulations.58 
Global companies are seeking to propagate principles for 
responsible business conduct in different ways.59 These ways 
 
common affairs” and opining that governance is patterned social interaction.) 
 54. Id. at 8 (emphasizing that regardless of how it is conceived, 
governance is not government). 
 55. James N. Rosenau, Citizenship in a Changing Global Order, in 
GOVERNANCE WITHOUT GOVERNMENT: ORDER AND CHANGE IN WORLD 
POLITICS, supra note 49, at 286–287 (noting that depending on an individual’s 
loyalty, he or she may prefer governance by a territorial community, a 
previously-existing nation-state, a historic nation, a regional community, etc.).  
 56. John Donahue, On Collaborative Governance 1–2 (Corp. Soc. 
Responsibility Initiative, Working Paper No. 2, 2004) (contradicting the notion 
that public governance is outside of and transcendent to government, and 
instead noting that governance is what government does; firms and NGOs 
work in collaboration with, not outside of, the government parameter).  
 57. See generally James W. Nickel, Is Today’s International Human 
Rights System a Global Governance Regime?, 6 J. ETHICS 353, 353 (2002). 
 58. McBarnet, supra note 27, at 9–13 (describing the evolution of CSR 
from focusing on the bottom line alone to considering people, the planet, and 
profits; as major companies adopt CSR policies, the range of socio-economic 
issues continue to expand and impact civil society, and particularly NGOs). 
 59. See Laura Albareda, Corporate Responsibility, Governance and 
Accountability: From Self-Regulation to Co-Regulation, 8 CORP. GOVERNANCE 
430, 431 (2008) (discussing the rapid growth of responsible business policies 
among transnational corporations and the evolving corporate behavior, 
featuring new collaborations and increased cooperation among firms, NGOs, 
and transnational companies). 
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are classified as: (1) corporate self-regulatory initiatives which 
are voluntary projects taken on individually in the market; (2) 
inter-firm and cross-industry cooperative initiatives which are 
voluntary tools established cooperatively between firms and 
business associations; and (3) collaborative arrangements and 
multi-stakeholder partnerships which are voluntary schemes 
devised collaboratively with other entities like public-private 
and hybrid partnerships (governments, international 
organizations, NGOs, trade unions, and governments).60  
 
2. Corporate Self-Regulatory Initiatives 
Numerous large, global companies institute their own 
codes of conduct that aim to regulate their operations 
worldwide.61 One example of voluntary self-regulation is the 
Leon Sullivan Foundation’s promulgation of the Global 
Sullivan Principles of Social Responsibility (the “Principles”) in 
1999.62 The Principles span a breadth of CSR concerns 
including employee freedom of association, health and 
environmental standards, and sustainable development.63 
Fortune 500 companies are now motivated to adjust their 
internal practices to comply with the standards found within 
the Principles.64  
 
 60. Id. at 435–436.  
 61. See, e.g., Gene R. Laczniak & Jacob Naor, Global Ethics: Wrestling 
with the Corporate Conscience, BUS. 3, 7 (July-Sept. 1985) (discussing the 
corporate examples of Caterpillar Tractor, Allis Chalmers, Johnson’s Wax, and 
Rexnord).  
 62. See Appendix 27: The Sullivan Principles: Statement of Principles of 
U.S. Firms with Affiliates in the Republic of South Africa, in GLOBAL CODES 
OF CONDUCT, supra note 28, at 388–90 (listing the seven main principles 
established by the Sullivan Foundation). 
 63. Oliver F. Williams, A Lesson from the Sullivan Principles: The 
Rewards for Being Productive, in GLOBAL CODES OF CONDUCT, supra note 28, 
at 57–82 (providing an overview of the purposes of the Sullivan Principles, 
which include supporting economic, social, and political justice by firms 
wherever they conduct operations; advancing human rights and promoting 
equality of opportunity at all levels of employment, including racial and 
gender diversity on decision-making committees and boards; and training and 
advancing disadvantaged workers for technical, supervisory, and management 
opportunities).  
 64. See, e.g., Gordon Leslie Clark & Tessa Hebb, Why Do They Care?: The 
Marketfor Corporate Global Responsibility and the Role of Institutional 
Investors 17–23, 34, (June 16, 2004) (presented at the Using Pensions for 
Social Control of Capitalist Investment Conference), available at 
http://www.community-wealth.org/_pdfs/articles-publications/state-
local/paper-clark.pdf) (describing how CalPERS may withhold investments 
from companies that do not meet the Sullivan Principles, thus creating the 
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Another example, the Global Business Standards Codex 
(“GBS Codex”), was published by a group of scholars in 2005.65 
Intended “as a benchmark for [firms] wishing to create their 
own world-class code,” the GBS Codex set forth eight principles 
shared by five well-known codes embraced by the world’s 
largest companies.66 The principles incorporated standards in 
the following categories: citizenship, dignity, fairness, fiduciary, 
property, reliability, responsiveness, and transparency.67 
Individual corporate codes of conduct usually contain an 
amalgamation of prudential, technical, and moral norms, 
declared as general principles.68 Critics point to the various 
codes’ failures to include enforcement sanctions and failures to 
emphasize profit maximization.69 Yet, corporations increasingly 
specify criteria such as “profitability” and “shareholder 
interests” in their mission statements.70 Nevertheless, they also 
affirm that corporate responsibility for “stakeholder interests” 
means considering both community interests and 
sustainability.71 
 
risk of reputational harm). 
 65. See generally Lynn Paine, Rohit Deshpandé, Joshua D. Margolis, & 
Kim Eric Bettcher, Upto Code: Does Your Company’s Conduct Meet World-
Class Standards?, HARV. BUS. REV., Dec. 2005, at 122–133. 
 66. Id. at 124–25.  
 67. Id. at 125. 
 68. See Arlene I. Broadhurst, Corporations and the Ethics of Social 
Responsibility: An Emerging Regime of Expansion and Compliance, 9 BUS. 
ETHICS: EUR. REV. 86, 89 (2000) (stating that corporate codes of ethics tend to 
be a mixture of technical, prudential, and moral imperatives expressed in 
general statements of principle and with varying degrees of enforcement). See 
also Robert Kinloch Massie, Effective Codes of Conduct: Lessons from the 
Sullivan Principles and CERES Principles, in GLOBAL CODES OF CONDUCT, 
supra note 28, at 280–82 (describing the blizzard of cultural values making up 
corporate codes of conduct, including a mix of ends, means, duties, and goals 
both for companies and for broader corporate responsibility); S. Prakash Sethi, 
Gaps in Research in the Formulation, Implementation, and Effectiveness 
Measurement of International Codes of Conduct, in GLOBAL CODES OF 
CONDUCT, supra note 28, at 123–25 (listing the core principles in codes of 
conduct as moral and ethical, economic and competitive, and organizational 
and institutional). 
 69. James E. Post, Global Codes of Conduct: Activists, Lawyers, and 
Managers in Search of a Solution, in GLOBAL CODES OF CONDUCT, supra note 
28, at 111 (discussing the lack of and difficulty associated with enforcement of 
codes of conduct). 
 70. Broadhurst, supra note 68, at 89.  
 71. See Johnson & Johnson, Our Credo, 
http://www.jnj.com/wps/wcm/connect/c7933f004f5563df9e22be1bb31559c7/our-
credo.pdf?MOD=AJPERES (naming its responsibilities to doctors and nurses, 
parents, its employees, the community, the environment, and its 
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3. Inter-Firm and Cross-Country Cooperative Initiatives 
As key agents in the global economy, transnational firms 
wield enormous influence over economic activities.72 Firms use 
various instruments to influence global civil society.73 Among 
the more significant mechanisms are cross-industry and inter-
firm cooperative initiatives.74 Such initiatives are developed 
through CSR business associations,75 which formulate 
strategies for concerted action in the form of self-regulating 
proposals within the private sector.76 These non-governmental 
associations of businesses promote the dissemination of best 
business practices.77 They aim to establish universal, uniform 
standards to combat a wide range of practices including 
apartheid, conflicts of interest, deception, discrimination, 
embezzlement, executive compensation, fraud, forgery, 
genocide, insider trading, the misuse of pension funds, slavery, 
theft, and corruption.78  
 
shareholders). 
 72. Virginia Haufler, Self-Regulations and Business Norms: Political Risk, 
Political Activism, in PRIVATE AUTHORITY AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 199, 
199–201 (A. Claire Cutler, Virginia Haufler, & Tony Porter eds., 1999) (noting 
that corporate agreements among firms impact international economic 
regulations by conferring a sense of legitimacy by creating an accepted way of 
doing business in certain industries; industry norms then have greater 
ramifications for production and local and global political relations).  
 73. See, e.g., Albareda, supra note 59, at 434–36. 
 74. See id. (calling inter-firm cooperation the most important mechanism 
and noting that the voluntary CSR hybrid crosses industries and creates 
public-private hybrid partnerships).  
 75. See id.    
 76. See id. at 435 (listing business associations that have adopted CSR 
mechanisms: Business in the Community, Business for Social Responsibility, 
Caux Round Table, CSR Europe, Forum Empresa, International Business 
Leaders Forum, and World Business Council for Sustainable Development 
(WBCSD)).  
 77. E.g., REDEFINING LEADERSHIP: BSR REPORT 2010 , available at 
http://www.bsr.org/pdfs/bsr-report/bsr_report_2010.pdf (describing Business 
for Social Responsibility (BSR)’s annual achievements, including running a 
program for business ethics, the workplace, the marketplace, the community, 
the environment, and the global economy). 
 78. See Appendix 26: The Caux Principles: Business Behavior for a Better 
World, in GLOBAL CODES OF CONDUCT, supra note 28, at 384–88 (describing 
the Caux Round Table, an international group of business executives 
headquartered in Switzerland, which has adopted an international code for 
multinational firms in Europe, North America, and Japan; the Code identifies 
five basic principles which serve as the aspirational mark for business leaders 
worldwide, thus extending beyond principles embodied in earlier codes; the 
principles address stakeholder responsibility, social justice, mutual support, 
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Business associations serve as forums for corporate leaders 
to discuss and agree on CSR plans.79 This entails creation of 
consolidated private rules, standards, and management 
instruments, all in the absence of legally enforceable “hard” 
sanctions.80 The associations often serve as means for collective 
exertion of pressure in order, for instance, to defend 
corporations’ positions before national governments and 
international organizations like the European Union and the 
United Nations.81 As such, business associations serve as 
interfaces between public and private authorities.82  
Joining cooperative regulations is a sage business strategy 
for companies whose social or environmental practices have 
been spotlighted by activists.83 Whereas implementing higher 
environmental or social standards normally increases costs, 
inducing the competition to follow suit levels the playing field.84 
At least in theory, industry and cross-industry standards 
inhibit companies from competing with each other.85 Without 
them, firms would be running in a race to the bottom by 
adopting less rigorous protections for workers or the 
environment.86 Similarly, civil regulations help companies 
 
environmental concern, and avoidance of illicit operations and corrupt 
practices).  
 79. Albareda, supra note 59, at 435. 
 80. Id. at 433. 
 81. See, e.g., id. at 435 (“The WBCSD has defended a voluntary approach 
before the United Nations; CSR Europe has done the same before the 
European Commission and individual European governments, and BSR has 
done the same with the US government.”).  
 82. Id. at 436 (noting that although inter-firm initiatives are typically 
funded by corporate contributions, they sometimes receive backing from 
international organizations like the European Union, various national 
governments, and the United States).  
 83. See generally Alison Maitland, Industries Seek Safety in Numbers, 
FIN. TIMES, Nov. 25, 2005, at 1–3 (noting the growing phenomenon of global 
companies working together to implement standards so as to avoid individual 
reputational attacks). 
 84. See Marvin B. Lieberman & Shigeru Asaba, Why Do Firms Imitate 
Each Other?, 31 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 366, 366–367 (2006) (noting that imitation 
is common because firms want to avoid falling behind their rivals, and because 
leveling the playing field breeds competition). But see S. Prakash Sethi & 
Linda M. Sama, Ethical Behavior as a Strategic Choice by Large Corporations: 
The Interactive Effect of Marketplace Competition, Industry Structure and 
Firm Resources, 8 Bus. Ethics Q. 85, 89 (1998) (arguing that the conventional 
wisdom and popular notion that competition keeps businesses honest may not 
be accurate). 
 85. Kevin Jackson, VIRTUOSITY IN BUSINESS: INVISIBLE LAW GUIDING THE 
INVISIBLE HAND, 237 (Univ. of Pa. Press 2012).  
 86. Debora Spar & David Yaffe, Multinational Enterprises and the 
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complement one another in instituting best practices.87 They 
also help with communication and implementation of 
operational upgrades recommended by civil society.88 NGOs’ 
participation in civil regulations extends a higher level of 
legitimacy than can be achieved with codes of conduct authored 
by individual companies.89  
This partnership increases the credibility of companies’ 
commitments to corporate social responsibility.90 Moreover, 
transnational enterprises often follow their industry peers to 
implement comparable procedures and norms.91 This follow the 
leader dynamic spreads to managerial protocols including 
global CSR undertakings.92 Hence, if an industry leader 
consents to a code of practices, its industry peers typically 
follow suit.93 This trend also works across sectors.94 Indeed, the 
 
Prospects for Justice, 52 J. INT’L AFF. 557, 557 (1999) (suggesting that MNCs 
should act as their own self-regulators in improving corporate governance to 
avoid a downward race to the bottom where each party lowers its standards). 
 87. See Broadhurst, supra note 68 at 96–97 (discussing Shell as the 
prototype for other corporations in reforming best practices and encouraging 
other corporations to promote socially responsible conduct). 
 88. See id. at 97 (Noting that Shell’s success is based on its increasing 
awareness of the complexity of corporate compliance, communicating about 
agreed norms and business rules at the national and international levels of 
business ethics, and ultimately encouraging other corporations to implement 
reformed practices).  
 89. See, e.g., Dara O’Rourke, Market Movements: Nongovernmental 
Organization Strategiesto Influence Global Production and Consumption, 9 J. 
INDUS. ECOLOGY 115, 122 (2005) (discussing how NGOs’ anti-sweatshop 
campaigns against Nike encouraged Nike to seek sweatshop solutions and 
incorporate new, NGO-suggested practices into its code of conduct).  
 90. See O’Rourke, supra note 89, at 124–25 (describing the role of NGOs 
in corporate accountability, including exposing corporate misdeeds to 
consumers, punishing poor performers, monitoring the environmental and 
social impacts made by corporations, and promoting broad, long term solutions 
capable of transforming the entire market). 
 91. See generally Lieberman & Asaba, supra note 84, at 366–385 
(suggesting that firms imitate one another because they perceive competitors 
as having superior information or practices the firms want to incorporate 
and/or because the firms strive to remain competitive and limit potential 
rivalry). 
 92. Id. at 367 (noting that several studies have shown that imitation of 
superior products, processes, and managerial systems is widely recognized as 
a fundamental part of the competitive process).  
 93. See, e.g., id. at 371 (discussing the major impact that Wal-Mart, 
Barnes and Noble, and Amazon had in legitimizing web retail by choosing to 
sell their products online; such firms are leaders and others hope to jump on 
their successful bandwagons by emulating their past ideas and practices).  
 94. See e.g., Broadhurst, supra note 68, at 91, 95 (depicting the trend of 
social responsibility practices across sectors through the examples of Tommy 
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rise of civil regulations among global companies and industries 
has provided its own impetus as market participants wish to 
avoid losing reputational capital.95 
Lastly, even ill-intended modifications in standards often 
have substantial and lasting impacts on business practices.96 
CSR-type initiatives originating as mere symbolic gestures or 
efforts at appeasement may well acquire legitimacy among 
global civil society.97  
In today’s increasingly transparent global economy, 
staffing a CSR office, sending out an annual CSR report, 
combining forces with NGOs, signing voluntary industry codes, 
and having a chief reputation officer are becoming standard 
operating practices for management at global companies that 
attract high visibility.98  
 
4. Collaborative Arrangements and Mutli-Stakeholder 
Partnerships 
Along with self-regulation instruments, transnational 
firms are increasingly implementing various CSR mechanisms 
and civil regulations geared to numerous collaborative 
schemes.99 These kinds of initiatives emerge from crossbreed 
devices originating with civil society bodies and business 
associations.100 One of the motivations for collaborative 
governance is the ability to provide public goods through 
 
Hilfiger in the clothing industry and Shell in the gas, oil, and petrochemical 
industry).  
 95. See Maitland, supra note 83, at 1 (arguing that in an increasingly 
complex and risky global supply chain, the world’s largest companies are 
seeking strength in numbers and collaborating in areas like labor and 
environmental standards to lower the risk of an attack on their individual 
reputations).  
 96. See Lieberman and Asaba, supra note 84, at 381–82 (explaining that 
regardless of the motivation for imitation, it continues to permeate corporate 
behavior and yield reverberating effects).  
 97. See Claire Moore Dickerson, Human Rights: The Emerging Norm of 
CorporateSocial Responsibility, 76 TULSA. L. REV. 1431, 1439–41 (2001–2002) 
[hereinafter Emerging Norm]; see also Claire Moore Dickerson, Transnational 
Codes of Conduct Through Dialogue: Leveling the Playing Field for 
Developing-Country Workers, 53 U. FLA. L. REV. 611, 613–14 (2001).  
 98. See generally Emerging Norm, supra note 97, at 1431 (discussing the 
relationshipbetween corporate social responsibility and human rights 
movement).  
 99. See Albareda, supra note 59, at 435–36 (listing and describing 
collaborative CSR methods). 
 100. See id. at 435–36. 
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alliances.101 For example, some civil regulations and civil 
regulatory bodies have been instituted with the backing of 
trade unions, inter-state organizations, or governments.102 
Nevertheless, nation-states do not insist on enforcing 
regulations which are not compulsory.103 Instead, states 
commonly play the role of intermediaries.104 States extend 
assistance to firms, NGOs, and labor unions to find consensus 
on mutual standards.105 Through such efforts, states use multi-
stakeholder soft-power to achieve regulatory ends.106  
Business-NGO cooperative arrangements have become 
more important within the last decade,107 displaying a wide 
variety of configurations.108 In addition, an array of regulatory 
bodies is undertaking multi-stakeholder projects like the 
Ethical Trading Initiative which seeks to promote compliance 
with labor guidelines within the context of business supply 
 
 101. See Zadek, supra note 20, at 4. 
 102. See The Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights, 
available at http://www.voluntaryprinciples.org/files/ 
voluntary_principles_english.pdf (last visited Sept. 24, 2012) (noting that the 
governments of the United States and the United Kingdom assisted companies 
in extractive industries in assembling Voluntary Principles on Security and 
Human Rights).   
 103. See generally O’CONNELL, supra note 37, at 110 (explaining the 
advantages to nation-states of adopting flexible soft-law solutions that need 
not be rigidly enforced).  
 104. See JOHN BRAITHWAITE & PETER DRAHOS, GLOBAL BUSINESS 
REGULATION (Cambridge Univ. Press, 2000) (discussing the post-World War II 
involvement of the United States and other nations in setting up multi-lateral 
trade negotiation). 
 105. See id. at 199–200 (describing efforts aimed at reaching consensus).  
 106. See id. (detailing the ways states involve themselves in trade beyond 
hard-law treaties).  
 107. See Peter Utting, Corporate Responsibility and the Movement of 
Business, 15 DEV. PRAC. 375, 384–85 (2005).  
 108. NGOs like Amnesty International, the Clean Clothes Campaign, 
Oxfam, and the World Wildlife Fund team up with trade associations active in 
the areas of apparel, cocoa, timber, coffee, mining, and toys, as well as trade 
unions, and other organizations like the Sustainable Forestry Initiative and 
the International Standards Organization. See Tim Bartley, Institutional 
Emergence in an Era of Globalization: The Rise of Transnational Private 
Regulation of Labor and Environmental Conditions, 11 AM. J. SOC. 297, 335 
(2007) [hereinafter Institutional Emergence in an Era of Globalization]. See 
also Tim Bartley, Certifying Forests and Factories: States, Social Movements, 
and the Rise of Private Regulation in the Apparel and Forest Products Fields, 3 
POL. & SOC’Y 433, 434–35 (2003) (discussing cooperation in the area of forest 
management); Lars H. Gulbrandsen, Overlapping Public and Private 
Governance: Can Forest Certification Fill the Gaps in the Global Forest 
Regime?, 4 GLOBAL ENVTL. POL. 75, 84 (2004). 
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chains.109 The growth of these arrangements has given 
corporations a role in global public policy networks.110 Global 
public policy networks are coalitions linking civil society 
organs, firms, government agencies, international 
organizations, NGOs, professional associations, and religious 
groups.111 The establishment of standards, development of 
regulatory structures, and creation of assessment and 
enforcement systems form global public policy networks.112 
Companies joining global public policy networks commit to 
dialoging with other stakeholders to devise ethical 
standards.113 Accountability is difficult without these 
monitoring mechanisms.114  
For instance, the Global Reporting Initiative is a 
partnership of the Coalition for Environmentally Responsible 
Economies (“CERES”) and the United Nations Environmental 
Program (“UNEP”), linking firms, governments, media, NGOs, 
and professional associations in an effort to establish uniform 
reporting standards to assess the organizations’ environmental 
and social impacts.115 Signatory firms consent to observe 
CERES principles and to preserve and protect the environment 
at levels exceeding what local law mandates.116 CERES works 
closely with signatory companies to ensure compliance with 
core sustainability principles.117 
Some Western NGOs perceive co-regulation initiatives as 
 
 109. Other multi-stakeholder arrangements include the Forest 
Stewardship Council, the Global Reporting Initiative, the Marine Stewardship 
Council, and the United Nations Global Compact. See, e.g., About GRI, 
GLOBALREPORTING.ORG, http://www.globalreporting.org/About-
gri/pages/default.aspx (last visited Sept. 14, 2012) (describing the multi-
stakeholder operations and goals of GRI).  
 110. David Antony Detomasi, The Multinational Corporation and Global 
Governance: Modelling Global Public Policy Networks, 71 J. BUS. ETHICS 321, 
321 (2007). 
 111. Wolfgang H. Reinicke, The Other World Wide Web: Global Public 
Policy Networks, 117 FOREIGN POL’Y 44, 44 (2000). See generally WOLFGANG 
H. REINICKE, GLOBAL PUBLIC POLICY: GOVERNING WITHOUT GOVERNMENT? 
228 (1998). 
 112. BRAITHWAITE & DRAHOS, supra note 104, at 551.  
 113. See id. at 159 (noting the historical development of multi-stakeholder 
ethics development).  
 114. See id. at 168–69.  
 115. See What is GRI, GLOBALREPORTING.ORG, 
https://www.globalreporting.org/information/about-gri/what-is-
GRI/Pages/default.aspx (last visited Sept. 14 2012).  
 116. See id. 
 117. See id. 
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means of exerting some influence on trends in multinational 
corporate behavior.118 Adjusting procurement protocols of mega 
enterprises can bring about greater sustainability gains than 
enacting numerous national laws and regulations.119 Although 
some NGOs stress strategies that “name and shame” 
multinational enterprises, others try to team up with 
companies and industry associations to establish voluntary 
standards and assume an active role in the enforcement of 
those standards.120 NGOs’ forming of coalitions with 
transnational companies has been instrumental to the creation, 
legitimacy, and efficacy of civil regulations.121 A number of 
European governments, including the European Union, have 
offered substantial support for global CSR.122 Some European 
governments implicitly endorse CSR by mandating that 
companies trading on their stock exchanges disseminate 
annual reports recounting sustainability accomplishments.123 
Public pension funds are either encouraged or, at times, 
required to take firms’ environmental and social track records 
into account in choosing investments.124 Some governments 
grant preferences for privately certified merchandise pursuant 
 
 118. See VOGEL, supra note 5, at 167–68.  
 119. Christopher McCrudden, Corporate Social Responsibility and 
Procurement, in THE NEW CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY: CORPORATE SOCIAL 
RESPONSIBILITY AND THE LAW 115–16 (Doreen McBarnet et al. eds., 2007). See 
generally Philipp Pattberg, The Institutionalization of Private Governance: 
How Business and Nonprofit Organizations Agree on Transnational Rules, 18 
GOVERNANCE 589, 590 (2005) (describing the shift from public to private 
accountability forms).  
 120. See Institutional Emergence in an Era of Globalization, supra note 
108, at 299–300.  
 121. See Gary Gereffi et al., The NGO-Industrial Complex, 125 FOREIGN 
POL’Y 56, 61 (2001) (discussing the improvements in civil regulation 
legitimacy after NGOs became involved); Dennis A. Rondinelli & Ted London, 
How Corporations and Environmental Groups Cooperate: Assessing Cross-
Sector Alliances and Collaborations, 1 ACAD. MGMT. EXEC. 61, 71–72 (2003) 
(detailing successful inter-organizational standard compliance mechanisms); 
Pattberg, supra note 119, at 591–93. 
 122. Kristina Herrmann, Corporate Social Responsibility and Sustainable 
Development: The European Union Initiative as a Case Study, 11 IND. J. 
GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 205, 226–27 (2004). 
 123. See generally Ioannis Ioannou & George Serafeim, The Consequences 
of Mandatory Corporate Sustainability Reporting 2–3 (Harv. Bus. Sch., 
Working Paper No. 11–100, 2012) (discussing the types of quasi-mandatory 
reporting).  
 124. See ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION AND DEV., PROMOTING 
SUSTAINABLE CONSUMPTION: GOOD PRACTICES IN OECD COUNTRIES 34 
(2008). 
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to governments’ procurement policies.125 Various features of 
civil regulation resemble characteristically European attitudes 
toward business regulation in that they lean heavily on 
voluntary agreements and soft-law, often turning to non-state 
actors to establish regulatory standards.126 In the eyes of some 
European governmental authorities, endorsing global civil 
regulations is a convenient way of assuaging home-country 
activists and trade unions that may be antagonistic to 
globalization and the immense political sway held by 
multinational enterprises.127 Nevertheless, this does not serve 
to extend sole regulatory authority to states over firms doing 
business within their respective jurisdictions.128 
One notable benefit of civil regulations as mechanisms of 
global business regulation is that their terms are outside the 
World Trade Organization’s (“WTO”) purview, whose 
regulations have force only when accepted by national 
governments.129 Although the WTO considers government-
mandated eco-labels as potential trade barriers, private 
 
 125. See McCrudden, supra note 119, at 112 (explaining how this process 
came into being in the United Kingdom after the Labour Party regained power 
in the late 1990s).  
 126. See Jan Willem Biekart, Negotiated Agreements in EU Environmental 
Policy, in NEW INSTRUMENTS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY IN THE EU 166 
(Jonathan Golub ed., 1998); Olivier Borraz et al., Is It Just About Trust? The 
Partial Reform of French Food Safety Regulation, in WHAT’S THE BEEF?: THE 
CONTESTED GOVERNANCE OF EUROPEAN FOOD SAFETY 137–39 (Christopher 
Ansell & David Vogel eds., 2006); MICHELLE EGAN, CONSTRUCTING A 
EUROPEAN MARKET 263 (2001); Jonathan Golub, New Instruments for 
Environmental Policy in the EU: Introduction and Overview, in NEW 
INSTRUMENTS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY IN THE EU 5, 13–15,(Jonathan 
Golub ed., 1998); Karl-Heinz Ladeur, Towards a Legal Concept of the Network 
in European Standard-Setting, in EU COMMITTEES: SOCIAL REGULATION, LAW 
AND POLITICS 151, 156–59 (Christian Joerges & Ellen Vos eds., 1999); Stephen 
Tindale & Chris Hewett, New Enviromental Policy Instruments in the UK, in 
NEW INSTRUMENTS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY IN THE EU 52–53 (Jonathan 
Golub ed., 1998); Frans van Waarden, Taste, Traditions, and Transactions: 
The Public and Private Regulation of Food, in WHAT’S THE BEEF?: THE 
CONTESTED GOVERNANCE OF EUROPEAN FOOD SAFETY 56-57 (Christopher 
Ansell & David Vogel eds., 2006). 
 127. See Institutional Emergence in an Era of Globalization, supra note 
108, at 337. 
 128. See, e.g., General Information, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION OF 
SECURITIES COMMISSIONS, http://www.iosco.org/about/ (last updated Oct. 
2012).  
 129. See Steven Bernstein & Erin Hannah, Non-State Global Standard 
Setting and the WTO: Legitimacy and the Need for Regulatory Space, 11 J. 
INT’L ECON. L. 575, 577–78 (2008). 
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product certifications and labels do not have such a status.130 
Similarly, whereas companies may require global suppliers’ 
compliance with sustainability rules and labor standards as a 
prerequisite for transacting business, governments typically 
may not condition market access upon such requirements.131  
In the case of co-regulation and multi-stakeholder 
partnerships, CSR’s focus shifts away from voluntariness and 
toward accountability and enforcement mechanisms.132 
Accordingly, public accountability mechanisms for private 
actors constitute a centerpiece of the emerging global 
governance paradigm.133 Global firms use corporate legitimacy 
management to shift the role of businesses in society.134 
Meanwhile, multi-stakeholder initiatives provide the forum for 
a dialogue between business and society—a dialogue that is 
required for accountability mechanisms to work.135 Moreover, 
involvement in co-regulation and enforcement of multi-
stakeholder devices is connected with the new idea of corporate 
citizenship, or what has been termed “political activism.”136 
Through these devices, citizens can influence and participate in 
dialogue with the conduct of businesses in the sphere of 
sustainability and CSR.137  
 
5. Reaction to Regulatory Breakdown 
Globalization has been changing the world economic 
 
 130. Barbara Fliess et al., CSR and Trade: Informing Consumers About 
Social and Environmental Conditions of Globalised Production, ¶¶ 44–46 
(Org. Econ. Cooperation & Dev. Working Paper No. 47, 2006). 
 131. See Vogel, supra note 5, at 169–71 (discussing the divergence of public 
and private interests). 
 132. See Utting, supra note 107, at 381–82. 
 133. See id. at 383–86 (listing and describing various organizations and 
conventions that utilize public accountability mechanisms). 
 134. See Beverly Kracher & Kelly D. Martin, A Moral Evaluation of Online 
Business Protest Tactics and Implications for Stakeholder Management, 114 
BUS. & SOC’Y REV. 59, 61–64 (2009) (discussing how businesses are managing 
corporate image in response to activists’ uses of the internet to protest 
“objectionable business practices”). 
 135. See Guido Palazzo & Andreas Georg Scherer, Corporate Legitimacy as 
Deliberation: A Communicative Framework, 66 J. BUS. ETHICS 71, 77, 82 
(2006) (emphasizing the importance of corporate legitimacy). 
 136. See generally Haufler, supra note 72 (noting that corporate behavior is 
not dictated only by profit maximization concerns). 
 137. See Dirk Matten & Andrew Crane, Corporate Citizenship: Towards an 
Extended Theoretical Conceptualization, 30 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 166, 172–73 
(2005) (detailing ways in which corporations interact with people). 
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landscape for the past several decades.138 Due to an opening of 
outlets for goods in emerging countries and decreased costs of 
producing goods, which is in turn a consequence of lowered 
labor costs and reduced tax burdens in such countries, 
significant changes in manufacturing have occurred.139 As a 
result, manufacturing operations have shifted away from 
industrialized nations toward developing nations.140 In 
addition, global corporations’ production and supply chains 
transcend national borders more than ever.141 The bulk of 
transnational commerce occurs among firms or inter-firm 
networks, so the ascendance of global civil regulation has, in 
large part, stemmed from a recognition that globalization 
dampens the ability of national legal authorities to effectively 
regulate global companies and markets.142 Correspondingly, it 
has been noted that although some multinational firms are as 
powerful as some small nation-states, they are less 
accountable.143 
While state and international business regulations are still 
growing in range and degree, today’s global economy, while 
highly integrated, is plagued by regulatory breakdown144 and a 
so-called “orchestration deficit.”145 The transnational character 
of global manufacturing strains national governments’ 
capabilities to control economic activity outside of and 
 
 138. THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN, THE LEXUS AND THE OLIVE TREE 6–7 (1999). 
See generally THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN, THE WORLD IS FLAT: A BRIEF HISTORY OF 
THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 51–53 (2007) (discussing global capitalism after 
the fall of the Berlin Wall). 
 139. Martin Wolf, Manufacturing at Risk from Global Shift to Asia, FIN. 
TIMES, May 23, 2011, at 3.  
 140. See ARCHIE B. CARROLL & ANN K. BUCHHOLTZ, BUSINESS & SOCIETY: 
ETHICS AND STAKEHOLDER MANAGEMENT 395 (7th ed. 2008) (observing the 
trend for jobs to follow manufacturing). 
 141. See RICHARD T. DE GEORGE, COMPETING WITH INTEGRITY IN 
INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 78–79 (1993). 
 142. See VOGEL, supra note 5, at 162–64 (discussing why civil regulation is 
necessary in a globalized world). 
 143. See Peter Newell, Environmental NGOs and Globalization, in GLOBAL 
SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 117, 121 (Robin Cohen & Shirin Rai eds., 2000). 
 144. See Peter Newell, Managing Multinationals: The Governance of 
Investment for the Environment, 13 J. INT’L DEV. 907, 908 (2002) (arguing that 
the limited scope of civil regulation leads to it being overwhelmed by the 
power of international firms). 
 145. Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Strengthening International 
Regulation Through “Transnational New Governance, 42 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L 
L. 501, 544–45 (2009) (describing the need to include more subtle and far-
reaching trans-national governance). 
JACKSON - Global Economic Governance (22 MINN J INTL L 71 (Winter 2013)) 2/21/2013  1:48 PM 
94 MINNESOTA JOURNAL OF INT’L LAW  [Vol 22:1 
 
straddling their own jurisdictions.146 National and global 
regulatory frameworks will remain seriously inadequate so 
long as national governments and global business enterprises 
remain incapable or ill-disposed to controlling the 
sustainability-related facets of international trade. The rise of 
civil regulation does not signify an outright replacement of 
state regulation.147 Rather, it signifies an attempt to expand 
regulation to a broad array of transnational corporate conduct 
that remains difficult to regulate via purely national 
mechanisms.148 The appearance of new kinds of public civil 
regulation has resulted in a type of decentralized “soft law” 
accountability, complementing nation-states’ regulations that 
have proven inadequate in the era of globalization.149 
 
B. ACCOUNTABILITY 
Because of fallout from major industry scandals, the recent 
global financial meltdown, and the increasing prevalence of 
accountability principles, corporate management is now 
implementing ethical, transparency, and disclosure 
standards.150 The need to adopt voluntary civil regulations is 
especially strong for firms operating in the global environment. 
The traditional concept of legal accountability is 
distinguishable from an emerging phenomenon of soft law 
accountability.151 The latter is especially intricate because it 
entails multifaceted components of accountability.152  
 
 
 146. Abbott & Snidal, supra note 10, at 44. 
 147. See Mathias Koenig-Archibugi, Transnational Corporations and 
Public Accountability, 34 GOV’T & OPPOSITION 234, 234–35 (2004). 
 148. Id.  
 149. See Christoph Knill & Dirk Lehmkuhl, Private Actors and the State: 
Internationalization and Changing Patterns of Governance, 15 GOVERNANCE 
41, 44–45 (2002) (discussing the congruence of global problems and global 
regulatory structures). 
 150. Among the names implicated in scandals are Bernard Madoff, 
Nicholas Leeson, Enron, WorldCom, Aldelphia, Arthur Anderson, and Tyco. 
See Diana E. Murphy, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines for Organizations: A 
Decade of Promoting Compliance and Ethics, 87 IOWA L. REV. 697, 707 (2002). 
See also Note, The Good, the Bad, and Their Corporate Codes of Ethics: Enron, 
Sarbanes-Oxley, and the Problems with Legislating Good Behavior, 116 HARV. 
L. REV. 2123, 2126 (2003); Brian A. Warwick, Commentary, Reinventing the 
Wheel: Firestone and the Role of Ethics in the Corporation, 54 ALA. L. REV. 
1455, 1466–71 (2003). 
 151. Kevin T. Jackson, Global Corporate Governance: Soft Law and 
Reputational Accountability, 35:1 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 41 (2010).  
 152. Id.  
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1. Hard Versus Soft Law Accountability 
Legal accountability means that normative regulatory 
standards are enforceable.153 Compliance with black-letter legal 
rules creates a presumption of validity in the eyes of judicial 
tribunals or quasi-judicial forums.154 The notion of legal 
accountability stems from the rule of law maxim. A vast body of 
civil and criminal law has developed to hold non-profit and for-
profit institutions legally accountable.155 In the international 
sphere, the WTO Dispute Settlement System, Hague 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, and International 
Criminal Court are all institutions that undertake the 
enforcement of “hard” international law.156  
As was the case with early international law phenomena, 
civil regulations lacking hard enforcement mechanisms 
function as normative standards and are intended to induce 
compliance.157 To the extent that corporations comply with soft 
law, it is not because they are deterred by enforcement 
sanctions but rather because they are interested in building or 
 
 153. See Ruth W. Grant & Robert O. Keohane, Accountability and Abuses 
of Power in World Politics, 99 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 29, 36 (2005) (discussing the 
requirement that individuals and entities be held to formal rules). 
 154. Cf. HANS KELSEN, PURE THEORY OF LAW 11 (1967) (analyzing norm 
validity and asserting that if norms are not actually followed, they lack 
validity). 
 155. See Christine Parker, supra note 8, at 208–15 (discussing meta-
regulation in hard-law applications); see also Alnoor Ebrahim, Making Sense 
of Accountability: Conceptual Perspectives for Northern and Southern 
Nonprofits, 14 NONPROFIT MGMT. & LEADERSHIP 191, 194–95 (2003) (detailing 
the legal need to meet prescribed standards of behavior). 
 156. Concerning violence and nation-states, substantial changes have come 
about in international standards, practices, and institutions. War crimes 
tribunals and the International Criminal Court were set up to hold heads of 
states perpetrating acts of violence against their own citizenry accountable. 
Developments like this signal a significant departure from customary norms 
governing the principle of national sovereignty. That principle extended 
immunity to heads of states from legal petitions for accountability, save from 
members of their own principalities. Indeed, an inaugural precept of the 
nation-state system, acknowledged from Westphalia in 1648 to Nuremberg in 
1946, held that heads of states were immune from prosecution. See generally 
Geoffrey Robertson, Ending Impunity: How International Criminal Law Can 
Put Tyrants on Trial, 38 CORNELL INT’L L. J. 649, 650 (2005).  
 157. But see Terry Nardin, Theorizing the International Rule of Law, 34 
REV. INT’L STUD. 385, 389 (2008) (citing Thomas M. Franck, The Power of 
Legitimacy and the Legitimacy of Power: International Law in an Age of Power 
Disequilibrium, 100 AM. J. INT’L L. 88 (2006)) (noting that compliance with 
international law is a result of a desire for legitimacy). 
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preserving their intangible reputational assets.158 Arguably, a 
régime of global civil regulations and their attendant informal, 
decentralized modes of enforcement constitute an integral part 
of both the domestic and international rule of law. However, 
they are often ignored by commentators because they are only 
backed by “soft” sanctions, the nature and extent of which are 
not well understood.159  
A deeper look into the various sources of soft law shows 
how intricate, complex, and subtle they can be. Global civil 
regulations often represent the result of compromises reached 
among private and public entities.160 Instead of imposing cost of 
compliance with formal regulations, civil regulations encourage 
corporations to scrutinize their conduct and guide it with 
voluntary self-regulation.161 While global civil regulations are 
subject to rapid change and are continually evolving, national 
law, dependent on its institutions to act, takes longer to 
evolve.162 
Yet, from the standpoint of the conventional rule of law 
maxim and its experience, voluntary CSR appears deficient. 
CSR is decentralized, carries conflicting norms, is orchestrated 
by unelected activists, business executives, and bureaucrats,163 
 
 158. See GÖRAN AHRNE & NILS BRUNSSON, Soft Regulation from an 
Organizational Perspective, in SOFT LAW IN GOVERNANCE AND REGULATION 
171, 187–89 (Ulrika Mörth ed., 2004). 
 159. See Andrew T. Guzman & Timothy L. Meyer, International Common 
Law: The Soft Law of International Tribunals, 9 CHI. J. INT’L L. 515, 519, 522-
23 (2009) (contending that reputational effects of following or forgoing soft law 
are difficult to anticipate and remain elusive). 
 160. David Vogel, Private Global Business Regulation, 16:3 ANN. REV. POL. 
SCI. 261, 270 (Dec. 30, 2007).  
 161. But see Ian Maitland, The Limits of Business Self-Regulation, 27 CAL. 
MGMT. REV., 132, 132-33 (1985) (arguing that self-regulation is ineffective 
because profit maximization is often at odds with compliance, thus 
compromising the validity). 
 162. KEVIN T. JACKSON, BUILDING REPUTATIONAL CAPITAL 38 (Oxford 
Univ. Press 2004) (“The idea is that the law [of soft law] resides in the actual 
judgment given, not in any crisp preexisting formulation in a statute or case 
precedent.”). A major task that companies face is accurately forecasting what 
these non-legal and unelected accountability-holders may be expecting from 
them. Whereas the authoritative sources of law applied and enforced by courts 
of law are generally recognized by members of the legal community, it remains 
unclear precisely what sources of “soft law” are applied by accountability-
holders. Consider the adage that the job of judges is to prophesize what courts 
will do. See Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 
457, 457–58 (1897). 
 163. From this standpoint, the rise of global governance raises questions 
about the legitimacy of the actors attempting to hold transnational firms 
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and does not employ any hard sanctions that can be 
administered following non-compliance.164 Accountability 
means that actors can ensure that other actors follow 
standards, and that actors may apply sanctions for non-
compliance with those standards.165 In the context of global 
economic governance, civil regulations that bear upon firms’ 
moral deportment arguably represent the strongest form of soft 
law sanctions, because firms’ reputations are one of their most 
valuable assets.166 
 
2. Components of Soft Law Accountability 
The process of corporate soft law accountability involves a 
triad of elements.167 First, soft law accountability presupposes 
the existence of civil regulations that hold companies 
accountable; compliance is expected.168 Like the rule of law 
maxim saying that the law must be knowable—for example, 
that it must be published so that citizens are aware of the 
rights and responsibilities given or imposed upon them by 
law—civil regulations must also be matters of common 
knowledge.169 Second, soft law accountability demands that 
enforcement agents possess relevant information about firms’ 
 
accountable. The theory of rent seeking proceeds from the hypothesis that the 
priority of typical bureaucrats are to advance their own self-interest. 
Consequently, if restraints of accountability and election are removed, 
bureaucrats become owners of rents, with the power to potentially raise these 
rents at the expense of those for whom the resources are supposed to benefit. 
United Nations institutions provide substantial income for the politicians and 
bureaucrats that control them, and that the objectives for which they were set 
up are absorbing ever smaller portions of their internal budgets. See generally 
ROSEMARY RIGHTER, UTOPIA LOST: THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE WORLD 
ORDER 56–63 (1995). 
 164. See Cyrus Mehri, Andrea Giampetro-Meyer & Michael B. Runnels, 
One Nation, Indivisible: The Use of Diversity Report Cards to Promote 
Transparency, Accountability, and Workplace Fairness, 9 FORDHAM J. CORP. & 
FIN. L. 395, 400–01 (2004). 
 165. See Ruth W. Grant & Robert O. Keohane, supra note 153, at 29. 
 166. See Jonathan M. Karpoff & John R. Lott, Jr., The Reputational 
Penalty Firms Bear from Committing Criminal Fraud, 36 J. L. & ECON. 757, 
758-59 (1993) (noting that the majority of falling stock price in the wake of 
corporate malfeasance, whether proven or not, is attributable to reputational 
loss whereas anticipated legal sanctions, including fines and damage awards, 
comprise as little as 6.5% of the decline in share value). 
 167. See generally Robert O. Keohane, The Concept of Accountability in 
World Politics and the Use of Force, 24 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1121, 1123-24 (2003) 
(illustrating the power dimensions of accountability demands). 
 168. See id. at 1123. 
 169. See id. 
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actions to evaluate compliance with applicable civil 
regulations.170 On the one hand, firms must be aware of 
expectations before they can be held accountable for them.171 
On the other hand, enforcement agents must know by what 
standards to render an assessment of business conduct.172 
Because accurate information is vital, at least some 
transparency and dialogue among stakeholders appears to be a 
prerequisite for soft law accountability.173 Third, soft law 
accountability requires incentives for compliance.174 
Enforcement agents must be able to impose informal sanctions 
or rewards. To be sure, no worldwide government, democratic 
or otherwise, exists to provide wholesale regulation.175 
Demands for corporate accountability are therefore 
decentralized and diffused.176 
 
3. Enforcement from Informal Evaluation 
Whereas the concept of legal accountability derives its 
central meaning from the notion of the rule of law, the concept 
of soft law accountability may be understood in terms of market 
participants’ informal evaluations of business conduct. For 
example, individual investors and mutual funds may cease 
investing in companies with objectionable practices or 
policies.177 Some pension funds shun securities of certain 
 
 170. See id. at 1124 (discussing the need of information in order to 
effectively hold one accountable). 
 171. See Alasdair B. Ross, Reputation: Risk of Risks, ECONOMIST 
INTELLIGENT UNIT, December 2005, at 1, 11. 
 172. See id. at 4-5. 
 173. See generally Pamela Stapleton & David Woodward, Stakeholder 
Reporting: The Role of Intermediaries, 114 BUS. & SOC’Y REV. 183, 184 (2009) 
(noting the important role of dialogue with and among stakeholders). 
 174. See Keohane, supra note 167, at 1123–24 (arguing that the notion of 
accountability involves both the sharing of information regarding actions, 
decisions, or behavior of some kind and the exercise of sanctions). 
 175. See PIERRE ROSANVALLON, DEMOCRACY PAST AND FUTURE 192–93 
(Samuel Moyn ed., 2006) (noting that a diffraction of conventional modes of 
representative democracy and a widespread suspicion of politics are occurring 
across the planet). Such developments increase the number of political 
players, diffusing political legitimacy. “We are moving bit by bit to more 
disseminated forms of civil democracy,” an “indirect democracy,” created by 
“whole congeries of efforts—through informal social movements but 
institutions too—intended to compensate for the erosion of trust by 
institutionalizing distrust.” Id. at 235-238. Indirect democracy is engaged in 
the deployment of “mechanisms of oversight, the creation of independent 
institutions, and the formation of powers of rejection.” Id. at 239. 
 176. Jackson, supra note 85, at 244.  
 177. See, e.g., Samuel B. Graves & Sandra A. Waddock, Institutional 
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companies on the basis of criteria determined by the pension 
funds’ beneficiaries.178 Investors may require higher interest 
rates on corporate bonds.179 Customers may decline to purchase 
products produced by firms struck by negative publicity 
stemming from human rights violations, unfair labor practices, 
or environmental violations.180 Some consumers are willing to 
incur added costs, like the cost of traveling farther, to punish 
retailers whose conduct they find egregiously unfair.181 Those 
in employment markets may select among competing job offers 
on the basis of the prospective employer’s publicity and 
reputation.182  
Business partners and associates comprise another type of 
forum for the evaluation of conduct.183 This forum functions as 
a peer-driven accountability network powered by the process of 
business partners’ reciprocal appraisals.184 Institutional 
lenders, for instance, use caution in scrutinizing their 
borrowers’ creditworthiness as well as that of their partners’ 
borrowers.185 Business enterprises rated low by their peers are 
less likely to find willing business partners among them.186 
These businesses find themselves in a strategic disadvantage 
and therefore tend to stagnate.187 
Next is the legendary “court of public opinion.”188 Members 
of civil society penalize business enterprises by spreading 
 
Owners and Corporate Social Performance, 37 ACAD. MGMT. J. 1034, 1034 
(1994). See also Kristin Friedery, Core Innovation Collaboration Success 
Stories, CORE CATALYST, (August 19, 2011, 9:32 AM), 
http://corecolorado.org/success-stories?mode=PostView&bmi=680022. 
 178. See R. Bruce Hutton, Louis D’Antonio & Tommi Johnsen, Socially 
Responsible Investing: Growing Issues and New Opportunities, 37 BUS. & 
SOC’Y. 281, 287-88 (1998). 
 179. Layna Mosley, GLOBAL CAPITAL AND NATIONAL GOVERNMENTS 18 
(2003). 
 180. See Deborah Spar, The Spotlight and the Bottom line, 77 FOREIGN 
AFF. 7, 9 (1998). 
 181. See Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch & Richard Thaler, Fairness as 
a Constraint on Profit Seeking: Entitlements in the Market, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 
728, 735–36 (1986). 
 182. JACKSON, supra note 162, at 13. 
 183. Grant & Keohane, supra 153. 
 184. Id. at 35 (“When standards are not legalized, we would expect 
accountability to operate chiefly through reputation and peer pressures, 
rather than in more formal ways.”).  
 185. JACKSON, supra note 162, at 13. 
 186. Id. at 14. 
 187. Id.  
 188. Id. at 36. 
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negative publicity.189 Legislators, jurists, regulators, fiscal 
watchdogs, newscasters, competitors, licensing bureaus, rating 
agencies, and markets all decree informal judgments about the 
reputations of market participants.190 In fact, such judgments 
seem to constitute a type of “soft power,” which has been 
characterized as the ability to shape the preferences of 
others.191 Companies with tarnished names find it hard to 
establish relationships, assert authority, or attract loyalty from 
others.192 
 
4. Dispersed Networks of Accountability 
Accountability in global economic governance is 
multifaceted and decentralized. Global companies operate 
within networks of continuous relationships.193 Firms are 
linked with their customers, suppliers, and rivals through 
strategic alliances.194 When companies enter into arrangements 
with parties like government regulators and special interest 
groups, they are establishing “soft law networks.”195 These soft 
law networks form channels of accountability which are divided 
by and cover a range of topical areas.196 On the other hand, 
 
 189. STEVEN HERZ ET AL., DEVELOPMENT WITHOUT CONFLICT: THE 
BUSINESS CASE FOR COMMUNITY CONSENT 14 (Jonathan Sohn ed. 2007) 
(“Reputation risk is the current and prospective impact on earnings and 
capital arising from negative public opinion.”). 
 190. For an example of a newscaster making an informal judgment about 
Nike’s reputation, see Simon Birch, How activism forced Nike to change its 
ethical game, GREENLIVING BLOG (July 6, 2012), 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/green-living-
blog/2012/jul/06/activism-nike.  
 191. JOSEPH S. NYE, JR., SOFT POWER: THE MEANS TO SUCCESS IN WORLD 
POLITICS 5 (2004). 
 192. Tammy Higginbotham, Unethical Behaviors and Their Effect on Small 
Business, YAHOO! VOICES (Oct. 3, 2010), http://voices.yahoo.com/unethical-
behaviors-their-effect-small-business-6904236.html.  
 193. HAKAN HAKANSSON & IVAN SNEHOTA, DEVELOPING RELATIONSHIPS IN 
BUSINESS NETWORKS 10 (Hakan Hakansson & Ivan Snehota eds., Routledge, 
1995).  
 194. See Nye, supra note 191.  
 195. See D. Daniel Sokol, Monopolists without Borders: The Institutional 
Challenge of International Antitrust in a Global Gilded Age, 4 BERKELEY BUS. 
L. J. 37, 97 (defining “soft law networks” as means by which information can 
be shared and cooperation can be facilitated).  
 196. See, e.g., id. at 53 (“Though the discussions have shifted to less 
contentious topics within the antitrust and international trade interface, 
market access issues remain one of the core difficulties that arise in this 
interface. The ability of antitrust institutions to address issues that interface 
with other areas of law has become increasingly relevant in a globalized world 
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relationships involving international organizations typically 
establish sequences of accountability.197 In addition, multiple 
intersecting accountability relationships exist when different 
groups of market participants with potentially diverse interests 
set out to hold other agents accountable for their behaviors.198  
Within the contemporary business environment, companies 
confront many and frequently incompatible accountability 
demands.199 Sometimes it is not enough to satisfy the demands 
of shareholders and credit markets.200 Merely complying with 
legal rules is often insufficient because the law typically trails 
behind quickly evolving social norms.201 Businesses must 
remain mindful of their constituencies’—peers, media, and 
advocacy groups—reactions to their actions.202 
 
C. CONCEPT OF RULE OF LAW 
In the interest of gaining a philosophical perspective, it is 
necessary to distinguish two methods of framework analysis. 
One method involves discussing the actual working 
arrangements that constitute global economic governance from 
the perspective of practitioners.203 The second method involves 
 
economy. Shortcomings of antitrust in addressing the effects of trade 
distortions threaten to limit the potential gains of trade liberalization.”).  
 197. See Keohane, supra note 167, at 1124 (noting that in a common 
accountability sequence, an agent will be authorized by a given accountability 
relationship but yet another such relationship will restrict it; for example, the 
International Accounting Standards Board holds companies responsible for 
accounting practices, yet it is itself accountable to the entities granting 
authority to it, namely the G-7 Finance Ministers and Central Bank 
Governors and the International Organization of Securities Commissions).  
 198. See, e.g., Stephanie A. Barbosa, Note, Implementation of the DOHA 
Declaration: Its Impact on American Pharmaceuticals, 36 RUTGERS L.J. 205, 
207–211 (2004) (citing Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights, Annex 1C, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing 
the World Trade Organization, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299; 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994)) 
(giving the example that the WTO and the Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights Agreement both attempt to hold multinational 
pharmaceutical companies accountable, yet shareholders of the 
pharmaceutical companies also hold firms accountable).  
 199. See Ross, supra note 171, at 11-13. 
 200. See id. at 7-8. 
 201. See Carol & Buchholtz, supra note 140, at 41. 
 202. See Jackson, supra note 162, at 109 (providing examples about how 
U.S. West was criticized for by gay-rights advocates when it contributed to the 
Boy Scouts of America and how Dayton-Hudson was criticized for supporting 
Planned Parenthood).  
 203. For an example of a work discussing the actual working arrangements 
that constitute global economic governance, see MAKING GLOBAL TRADE 
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abstracting from existing arrangements and theorizing about 
the idea of global economic governance as an order.204 
Abstracting in this context is similar to abstracting from the 
existing international legal system and theorizing about the 
concept of international law.205 
While the actual global governance schemes discussed in 
the preceding section represent contingent political and 
commercial arrangements, this section of the article is geared 
toward abstracting these contingent features in order to 
examine the presuppositions of global governance as an idea. In 
particular, the concern is how that idea relates to the concept of 
the rule of law.   
While global governance may indeed possess numerous 
beneficial features—among them is the promotion of more 
responsible competitiveness across global markets206—
questions remain about its capabilities to protect and promote 
the international rule of law, which presupposes some deeper 
authoritativeness. It is therefore necessary to clarify the 
concept of international rule of law and discuss the significance 
of that idea as it pertains to the moral authority of global 
governance régimes.  
The legitimacy of traditional international law and 
emergent approaches to global governance may be analyzed 
from a variety of standpoints on a theoretical level.207 As a 
threshold matter, determining whether to regard law in 
instrumental or non-instrumental terms, or in some 
combination of the two, must be made.208 
 
 
GOVERNANCE WORK FOR DEVELOPMENT: PERSPECTIVES AND PRIORITIES FROM 
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (Carolyn Deere Birkbeck ed., 2011).  
 204. See generally DAVID LEWIS, COUNTERFACTUALS 84 (Blackwell 
Publishers & Harv. Univ. Press 1973) (“Ordinary language permits the 
paraphrase: there are many ways things could have been besides the way they 
actually are.”).  
 205. See Nardin, supra note 26, at 389. 
 206. See Zadek & Mcillivray, supra note 19. 
 207. See APPROACHES TO GLOBAL GOVERNANCE THEORY (Martin Hewson 
& Timothy J. Sinclair eds., State Univ. of N.Y. Press, 1999) (identifying three 
approaches: (1) the use of global governance as a way to enhance the work of 
international organizations, (2) a revision of regime theory, and (3) a 
normative approach).  
 208. See Anne-Marie Slaughter & Steven R. Ratner, Symposium on Method 
in International Law: The Method Is the Message, 93 AM. J. INT’L L., 410, 410 
(1999) (noting that one way of addressing international law questions is the 
instrumentalist versus non-instrumentalist approach).  
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1. Instrumental Versus Non-Instrumental Viewpoints of 
Law 
The non-instrumental conception of law holds that the 
content of law is, in some sense, given; that law is immanent; 
that the process of law-making is not a matter of creation but 
one of discovery; that law is not the product of human will; that 
law has a kind of autonomy and internal integrity; and that 
law is, in some sense, objectively determined.209  
By contrast, the instrumental view of law holds that law is 
an instrumental process determined by non–legal factors, and 
its legitimacy comes from its ability to serve social purposes.210 
This instrumental conception of law is labeled as 
“pragmatism.”211  
One source of skepticism toward the concept of an 
international rule of law that is also a potential source of 
optimism toward global governance comes from scholars who 
view the concept of law in strictly instrumental terms.212 
Whether one is considering a domestic or international context, 
all that law can ever amount to is policy.213 The instrumental 
view conceives of the nature of law as simply a decision process 
rather than a coherent system of rules.214 To the extent that 
law engages rules, it does so only to promote the utilitarian 
objective of generating desired outcomes.215 The authority of 
such norms stems from their effectiveness in realizing such 
 
 209. BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, LAW AS A MEANS TO AN END: THREAT TO THE 
RULE OF LAW 11 (Cambridge University Press, 2006). 
 210. Brian Tamanaha, On the Instrumental View of Law in American Legal 
Culture 4 (St. John’s Univ. Sch. of Law Legal Studies, Research Paper Series 
Paper No. 08-0143, Aug. 2011).  
 211. See RONALD M. DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 152 (Harvard Univ. Press, 
1986). See also KEVIN T. JACKSON, CHARTING GLOBAL RESPONSIBILITIES: 
LEGAL PHILOSOPHY AND HUMAN RIGHTS (Univ. Press of Am., 1994) (applying 
the pragmatist conception of law to the international context). 
 212. Hent Kalmo, How Comparable Are Legal Concepts? The Case of 
Causation, XI JURIDICA INTERNATIONAL 45, 52 (2006) (listing Basil 
Markesinis as a scholar adopting an openly instrumental view of legal 
vocabulary).  
 213. Allen Bunchanan, Democracy and the Commitment to International 
Law, 34 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 305, 306–308 (2006) (noting that some states 
only use the instrumental theory of international law when such use is to their 
advantage).  
 214. Kalmo, supra note 212 (noting that Basil Markesinis claims that tort 
law concepts are words to help phrase decisions).  
 215. See, e.g., JOHN STUART MILL, UTILITARIANISM (Hackett Publishing 
Company 2001). 
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outcomes.216 
By contrast, non-instrumental norms are those which 
ought to be respected for their own sake, apart from some 
desired result.217 An example of a non-instrumental norm at 
the heart of the rule of law and human rights is one prescribing 
that because citizens are related to each other as moral equals, 
they have a right to be treated as equals.218 Likewise, the 
familiar requirements of the rule of law such as nullum crimen, 
nulla poena sine praevia lege poenali that serve as restraints on 
arbitrariness, limiting what authorities can do and how they go 
about doing it, are all of a non-instrumental character.219 
The existence of non-instrumental norms is what enables a 
distinction between just and unjust uses of force or coercion. 
While non-instrumental norms are similar to moral 
principles,220 they are nevertheless internal to law. 
 
2. Radical Skepticism 
Another view, skeptical of the rule of law maxim, comes 
from postmodernist portrayals of law. 221 Radical skeptics of 
law reject the notion of law as a coherent foundation for human 
coordination and collaboration.222 For instance, “[r]ights 
discourse is internally inconsistent, vacuous, or circular. Legal 
 
 216. See id.  
 217. Richard Arneson, Egalitarianism, STANFORD ENCYC. PHIL. (Edward 
N. Zalta ed., Spring 2009), available at 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2009/entries/egalitarianism/. 
 218. See RONALD M. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 227 (Harvard 
Univ. Press 1977). 
 219. See Jens David Ohlin, A Meta-Theory of International Criminal 
Procedure: Vindicating the Rule of Law 14 UCLA J. INT’L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 
77, 109-110 (Spring 2009) (“[P]rocedural and substantive justice are connected 
and not separate... this still allows that fair procedures have values intrinsic 
to them - for example, a procedure having the value of impartiality by giving 
all an equal chance to present their case”) (quoting John Rawls, POLITICAL 
LIBERALISM 421-23 (1993)).  
 220. See RICHARD MADSEN & TRACY B. STRONG, THE MANY AND THE ONE: 
RELIGIOUS AND SECULAR PERSPECTIVES ON ETHICAL PLURALISM IN THE 
MODERN WORLD 118 (Princeton Univ. Press 2003) (“A non-instrumental 
conception of . . . norms as commonly agreed upon moral principles is surely 
possible.”).  
 221. See, e.g., Thomas Diez & Jill Steans, A Useful Dialogue? Hebermas 
and International Relations, 31 REV. INT’L STUD. 127 (2005) (noting that the 
Habermas-style ethical model of dialogue and mutual recognition could 
support collaborative governance).  
 222. See, e.g., Duncan Kennedy, Legal Education as Training for 
Heirarchy, in THE POLITICS OF LAW, 40, 48 (David Kairys ed., Pantheon ed., 
1982).  
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thought can generate equally plausible rights justifications for 
almost any result.”223 Also, legal principles are both logically 
incoherent and normatively unattractive.224 Challenging the 
very idea of rule of law, John Hasnas writes: 
I refer to the myth of the rule of law 
because, to the extent this phrase suggests a 
society in which all are governed by neutral 
rules . . . there is no such thing. As a myth, 
however, the concept of the rule of law is both 
powerful and dangerous. Its power derives from 
its great emotive appeal. The rule of law 
suggests an absence of arbitrariness, an absence 
of the worst abuses of tyranny. 
Because the law is made up of contradictory 
rules that can generate any conclusion, what 
conclusion one finds will be determined by what 
conclusion one looks for, i.e., by the hypothesis 
one decides to test. This will invariably be the 
one that intuitively “feels” right, the one that is 
most congruent with one’s antecedent, 
underlying political and moral beliefs. Thus, 
legal conclusions are always determined by the 
normative assumptions of the decision maker.225 
It should be noted in response to the radical skeptics that 
any world view denying the possibility of objective moral truth 
within the context of domestic legal orders cannot, a fortiori, 
serve to justify an international rule of law.226 That is because 
the rule of law presupposes deliberative procedures for 
rendering decisions that establish obligations in the context of 
some legally ordered community.227 In this sense the rule of law 
applied to the global realm makes sense only if certain 
universal ideas are assumed: Kant’s concept of a human person 
 
 223. Id.  
 224. See Larry Alexander & Emily Sherwin, DEMYSTIFYING LEGAL 
REASONING 95-98 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2008). 
 225. John Hasnas, The Myth of the Rule of Law, 199 WIS. L. REV. 199, 201 
(1995). 
 226. See Gary Born, A New Generation of International Adjudication, 61 
DUKE L. REV. 775, 789 (citing Laurence R. Helfer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, 
Why States Create International Tribunals: A Response to Professors Posner 
and Yoo, 93 CALIF. L. REV. 899, 904 (2005)) (responding to skeptics and 
defending independent tribunals and quasi-judicial review bodies as 
mechanisms of the international rule of law). 
 227. Id. 
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as a member of a universal legal and moral community, and the 
notion of a cosmopolitan democracy.228  
The more general and abstract norms become, the more 
indeterminate their application will be.229 If one assumes that 
the rule of law requires certainty, predictability, consistency, 
and non-contradiction, then the unavoidable dependence of 
global governance régimes on general and abstract norms for 
setting out sustainability guidelines and human rights 
standards seems to call the rule of law into question. Is it 
therefore illusory to attempt to associate global governance 
with the rule of law? If one is committed to an ideal like the 
rule of law, there must be continual effort to separate authentic 
from inauthentic and legitimate from illegitimate.230 In 
actuality, there is no final attainment of the rule of law, 
whether in advanced domestic legal systems or in emerging 
global governance régimes. Analogously, there is no final 
accomplishment of practical rationality for human persons. 
Instead, the notions of practical rationality and rule of law are 
both regulative ideals that need to be continuously tracked.231 
In this regard, radical legal skeptics cling to a constitutive 
conception of rule of law.232 On this account, the rule of law is 
simply a characteristic patterned upon existing epistemological 
imperfections in legal orders, whether from rules or decision 
makers, the skeptics choose to criticize. The radical skeptics of 
law flatly deny the possibility of a legal system with the 
capability of rooting out the imperfections and correcting them. 
The conception advanced in this article is regulative, not 
constitutive. This means that the rule of law is understood as a 
 
 228. See DANIELE ARCHIBUGI, THE GLOBAL COMMONWEALTH OF CITIZENS: 
TOWARD COSMOPOLITAN DEMOCRACY 119–20 (Princeton Univ. Press, 2008). 
 229. See BENJAMIN GREENWOOD GREGG, COPING IN POLITICS WITH 
INDETERMINATE NORMS: A THEORY OF ENLIGHTENED LOCALISM 28 (SUNY 
Press, 2003) (“Because of their abstract character, norms are incapable of 
specifying what to do in every contingency and must be defined in terms of the 
occasions of their application; this is their core ambiguity.”).  
 230. Contra Jonathan R. Macey, Public and Private Ordering and the 
Production of Legitimate and Illegitimate Legal Rules, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 
1123, 1124 (1997) (discussing the “impossibility of distinguishing legitimate 
from illegitimate legal rules”).  
 231. See Michael Sean Quinn, Symposium on Taking Legal Argument 
Seriously: Argument and Authority in Common Law Advocacy and 
Adjudication: An Irreducible Pluralism of Principles, 74 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 
655, 775 (arguing that regulative ideals are involved in the concept of rule of 
law).  
 232. JOHN BRIGHAM, MATERIAL LAW: A JURISPRUDENCE OF WHAT’S REAL 
(Temple University Press 2009).  
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regulative principle mandating that global governance 
institutions and actors seek to make the standards arising from 
global governance schemes increasingly clear, consistent, fair, 
reasonable, and to maintain such public standards with 
intensifying commitments. From the standpoint of the 
regulative conception, any contradictions or inconsistencies 
that might be detected and seized upon by the radical skeptics 
would only serve as further inducements for pursuing the rule 
of law, as incentives for making the ideal more of a reality. 
 
3. Implied Components of Legality 
The rise of global economic governance syndicates leads to 
questions like whether and to what extent such régimes, 
particularly those that are “enforced” by sporadic and vicious 
“naming and shaming” campaigns of self-appointed activists 
who may deploy unscrupulous “dirty” political tactics, can 
reasonably be said to embody the rule of law, and what this 
might suggest in terms of their legal and moral authority.233 
Reference to the fundamental presuppositions of legality is 
illuminating. Basic implied elements constitute the “internal 
morality” of law or “the morality that makes law possible.”234 
Some implied elements include the existence of rules as 
opposed to ad hoc declarations, publicity, non-retroactivity, 
understandability, non-contradiction, capability of compliance, 
temporal constancy, and congruence between official behavior 
and rules.235 This underscores key questions raised earlier: to 
what extent do global business civil regulations at play in 
global governance mechanisms display a fidelity to such non-
instrumental and unwritten characteristics of legality? Are 
civil regulations dominated by instrumental objectives in 
promoting liberal policies? 
Another feature of the rule of law that warrants discussion 
 
 233. A central concern of legal philosophers since the middle of the 
twentieth century has been the nature of the rule of law. Arguably one reason 
for this concern was the rise and decline of totalitarian governments. 
Following the demise of Nazism, philosophers of law put their theories of law 
to test, in the famous Hart-Fuller debates, for example, with questions like 
whether the Hitler’s regime could meaningfully be deemed a legal system. See, 
e.g., H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. 
L. REV. 593 (1957). See also Lon L. Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law—A 
Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HARV. L. REV. 630 (1957). 
 234. See LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 39 (Yale Univ. Press 1964). 
 235. See id. (discussing implied elements which constitute the internal 
morality of law). 
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is its implied concern for the well-being of citizens standing in 
special relation to whomever undertakes to govern them. The 
rule of law ordains that citizens stand in relation to one 
another as members of a community.236 This is called the 
“community of principle.”237 
A community of citizens situated under a rule of law enjoys 
entitlements to pursue their freely chosen ends without 
interference, save when needed to restrain them from 
interference with each other’s freedom.238 
 
4. “Publicness” 
It is important to address the relationship between the rule 
of law and the multiplicity of “publics” relevant to the idea of a 
common public justification. In collaborative governance, a 
substantial part of the process of rulemaking connected with 
human rights standards is remote from any strictly democratic 
process.239 The ideas of the rule of law and human rights, 
however, presuppose the existence of some group of persons—
some public—in whose name the law stands. According to the 
rule of law, legal norms must be representative of the entire 
society and be addressed to issues of concern to society per se, 
rather than merely pertaining to matters of personal interest to 
people or groups that create the rules.240  
Because “publicness” is related to the democratic process of 
law-making,241 there are limits to this being realized at the 
international level. There is no global democracy in place on 
earth, after all.242 Although collaborative governance tends to 
 
 236. Dworkin, supra note 211, at 211.  
 237. Id. 
 238. Todd J. Zywicki, The Rule of Law, Freedom and Prosperity 3 (George 
Mason Sch. of Law, Law and Econ. Working Paper Series, Working Paper No. 
02-20). 
 239. See Jan Aart Scholte, Civil Society and Democracy in Global 
Governance 12 (CSGR Working Paper No. 65/01, 2001) (“Governance of global 
spaces is not only different, but also lacks democratic legitimacy.”).  
 240. See Jeremy Waldron, Can There be a Democratic Jurisprudence?, 58 
EMORY L.J. 675, 700 (2009). 
 241. Benedict Kingsbury & Megan Donaldson, From Bilateralism to 
Publicness in International Law 79, 85 (N.Y. Univ. Pub. Law and Legal 
Theory Working Papers, Working Paper No. 256, 2011), available at 
http://lsr.nellco.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1260&context=nyu_plltwp. 
 242. See Boris Kagarlitsky, Global Democracy Through National 
Democracy, BUILDING GLOBAL DEMOCRACY, 
http://www.buildingglobaldemocracy.org/ content/east-europe-and-central-asia 
(last visited Oct. 4, 2012) (noting that “no global democratic political process 
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extend the range of actors involved in formulating rules, there 
appears to be no immediate likelihood that transnational 
collaborative governance will institute processes that closely 
resemble democratic procedures within states.243 
As more and more sector-based and non-state agents 
assume roles in collaborative governance régimes, the question 
of whether such parties are authentic representatives of “the 
public” carrying authority over human rights matters naturally 
arises. This in turn raises the question of whether a 
purportedly “public” entity is really a genuine representative of 
a relevant public. It also raises the question of whether it 
makes sense to speak of a decision, along with the rules and 
principles upon which it is rendered, as standing in the name of 
an entire community, speaking to that entire community when 
it may in fact be addressed to a narrower group.244  
 
5. The Concept of a Regulative Principle 
Kant’s concept of a regulative principle or ideal helps 
clarify the meaning of rule of law in the global governance 
context.245 In Critique of Pure Reason, Kant set forth to 
establish what we know and how we can know it.246 Kant 
demonstrated the way society’s observation of the world must 
be bound together and organized on the basis of certain basic 
ideas and concepts.247 These basic concepts, such as the idea of 
cause and effect, shape people’s knowledge and understanding. 
Kant argued that some ideals are unattainable but still serve 
key functions.248 Among such ideas are those of truth, 
goodness, and beauty.249 People’s efforts to approach such 
ideals exert a profound influence on their actions, and people’s 
regard for them plays a vital role in the way people accept some 
 
can develop unless it is based on serious democratic change at the national 
and local levels.”).  
 243. Robert Dahl, Can International Organizations be Democratic? A 
Skeptic’s View, 19 DEMOCRACY’S EDGES 19–36 (Ian Shapiro & Casiano 
Hacker-Cordon eds., Cambridge Univ. Press1999).  
 244. See Benedict Kingsbury, International Law as Inter-Public Law, in 
NOMOS XLIX: MORAL UNIVERSALISM AD PLURALISM 174 (Henry R. Richardson 
& Melissa S. Williams eds., N.Y. Univ. Press, 2009).  
 245. Immanuel Kant, CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON (Norman Kemp Smith 
trans., 1929). 
 246. Id.  
 247. Id. 
 248. Id. 
 249. Id. 
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views and reject others.250 
Kant sets forth the notion of a regulative principle, which 
as an ideal is a specific, singular concept that exemplifies the 
perfection of some action, process, or object.251 For instance, an 
ideal legal order would be fair,252 treat all citizens as equals,253 
and resolve disputes254 in an objective and enlightened way. It 
is not possible for a regulative principle to actually be realized 
in the course of actual events.255 Consequently, critics of Kant’s 
philosophy attack it for laying emphasis upon states of affairs 
that are inaccessible or unattainable.256 However, such a 
charge does not appreciate the role that ideas play in 
constituting the possibility of understanding reality in the first 
place.  
A principle is considered regulative rather than 
constitutive when it is unachievable but is able to guide, 
balance, and mediate people’s actions in practical matters. A 
regulative principle constitutes an ideal to aim for, by which 
people are put in a position to measure their progress.257 By 
 
 250. George Miller, Reading Revolutions: Intellectual History: Emerson’s 
Optimism, available at 
http://hua.umf.maine.edu/Reading_Revolutions/Emerson.html (last visited 
Oct. 9, 2012) (“Our only access to truth, goodness, or to life itself, is through 
our own understanding and our own judgments.”).  
 251. Id. 
 252. John Tasioulas, International Law and the Limits of Fairness, 13:4 
EUR. J. INT’L L. 993 (2002).  
 253. See Douglas J. Amy, Government as the Champion of Justice, 
Equality, Freedom, and Security, GOVERNMENT IS GOOD, 
http://www.governmentisgood.com/articles.php?aid=12&p=1 (last visited Oct. 
10, 2012).  
 254. See Robert S. Done, Resolving Conflict Within the Organization: 
Creating “Win-Win” Solutions with Mediation, SOC’Y INDUS. & ORG. PSYCHOL., 
INC., available at http://www.siop.org/tip/backissues/tipjan99/3Done.aspx (last 
visited Oct. 10, 2012) (noting that although litigation, which relies on the legal 
order to resolve disputes, is common today, other methods of dispute 
resolution may also be useful).  
 255. Garth Kemerling, Kant: Experience and Reality, THE PHILOSOPHY 
PAGES, http://www.philosophypages.com/hy/5g.htm (last modified Nov. 12, 
2011) (“The absence of any formal justification for these notions makes it 
impossible for us to claim that we know them to be true, but it can in no way 
diminish the depth fo [sic] our belief that they are.”).  
 256. See, e.g., Rob Atkinson, Connecting Business Ethics and Legal Ethics 
for the Common Good: Come, Let Us Reason Together, 29 IOWA J. CORP. L. 469, 
500 (2004) (criticizing Kant’s notion of fairness because “as general critics of 
Kant have long noted, it may not be possible to show how fairness itself is 
universally binding, in and of itself, on all conscientious people.”). 
 257. See IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON A674/B702 (Norman 
Kemp Smith trans., St. Martin’s Press 1929) (arguing that regulative 
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contrast, constitutive principles dictate how things must be and 
come about from people’s insight into their essential nature.258 
Within the ideal realm, Kant contends that separate ideals 
do not necessarily contradict one another.259 Thus, people may 
go in pursuit of multiple ideals negotiated alongside each other. 
Because, however, people do not live in an ideal realm, conflicts 
among ideals arise.260  
 
6. Received View of Rule of Law 
The problem of reaching an adequate account of the rule of 
law is among the most important issues that global governance 
and international law must address.  
Among the various interpretations of the rule of law, the 
more widely accepted interpretations range across the so-called 
“thin” versus “thick” spectrum, accompanied also by the “rule-
by-law” idea.261 At one end of the spectrum, the “thin” or 
“formal” conception holds that the rule of law possesses only 
some minimal formal characteristics like the requirements that 
law must be publicly declared, have only prospective 
application, and be imbued with the attributes of generality, 
equality, and a reasonable degree of certainty or 
predictability.262 Beyond that, except for sharing an opposition 
to the arbitrary exercise of power, “thin” conceptions do not 
 
principles come into play in reconciling conflicts that come up for reason with 
themselves, and that regulative principles stem from people’s interests in 
gaining a certain possible perfection).  
 258. For further development of the regulative-constitutive distinction, see 
JOHN R. SEARLE, THE CONSTRUCTION OF SOCIAL REALITY 178 (1995) 
(explaining how some rules, like those of the game of chess, not only regulate 
the activity but also function to constitute it).  
 259. See IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 
(1797). 
 260. See NICOLAS RESCHER, ETHICAL IDEALISM 125 (1987) (arguing that an 
ideal constitutes a “component within a system, which makes it possible to 
strike a reasonable balance between the different and potentially discordant 
values.”).  
 261. See generally Robert, J. Barro, Rule of Law, Democracy, and Economic 
Performance, INDEX OF ECONOMIC FREEDOM, available at 
http://www.geser.net/Barro.pdf (providing an example of another account, one 
asserting that the rule of law constitutes a set of ideals that protect political 
arrangements like democracy or promote economic arrangements like free 
market capitalism). 
 262. See generally Thom Ringer, Development, Reform, and the Rule of 
Law: Some Prescriptions for a Common Understanding of the "Rule of Law“ 
and its Place in Development Theory and Practice (June 7, 2007) (unpublished 
note) (on file with author), available at 
http://www.law.yale.edu/documents/pdf/LawJournals/ringer.pdf. 
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attribute any particular requirements regarding the content of 
law.263 At the other end of the spectrum, “thick” or 
“substantive” conceptions deem the rule of law to entail 
protections for individual rights and to incorporate substantive 
considerations of justice.264 Under the “rule-by-law” conception, 
the idea of the rule of law stands in contrast to the 
discretionary rule of men which is associated with abuse of 
power by government officials.265  
Regarding the thin and thick distinction, it may be helpful 
to understand it in the way that mathematics treats 
dimensions. The multidimensional character of the rule of law 
can be acknowledged, noting that the thicker conceptions differ 
from the thinner ones by virtue of additional “coordinates” 
being added. As one moves to a “higher” (“thicker”) dimension, 
the “lower” (“thinner”) dimensions remain intact. This is 
another way of expressing the point that “[s]ubstantive theories 
are typically built on the back of formal ones.”266 In making 
comparisons amongst the various candidate conceptions, it is 
good to remember that the admonition that a “common critique 
of those who claim to articulate ‘thin’ theories is that 
substantive elements have been included by stealth.”267   
This article contends that a rule of law obtains only where 
actions, including not only those acts of sovereign states and 
their agents but also those of diverse economic actors in 
international institutions, are constrained by the regulative 
idea of law. 
This raises the challenging question of what law is.268 For 
 
 263. See generally id.  
 264. See generally id.  
 265. See BRIAN TAMANAHA, supra note 14 (“Stripped of all technicalities, 
this means that government in all its actions is bound by rules fixed and 
announced before-hand – rules which make it possible to foresee with fair 
certainty how the authority will use its coercive powers in given circumstances 
and to plan one’s individual affairs on the basis of this knowledge.”) (quoting 
FREIDRICH HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM 80 (1994)). 
 266. Simon Chesterman, An International Rule of Law? 56 AM. J. COMP. L. 
331, 341 (2008) (citing Randall Peerenboom, Varieties of Rule of Law, in ASIAN 
DISCOURSES OF RULE OF LAW: THEORIES AND IMPLEMENTATION OF RULE OF 
LAW IN TWELVE ASIAN COUNTRIES, FRANCE AND THE US 1, 5–6 (Randall 
Peerenboom ed., 2004)). 
 267. Id. (citing Peerenboom’s suggestion that the thin versus thick 
conceptions may be visualized as concentric circles, with the inner circle 
containing core components of a thin rule of law and itself embedded within a 
thick rule of law framework).  
 268. David Howarth, On the Question, “What Is Law?” 6:3 RES PUBLICA 
259 (2000).  
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the instant purpose, it is useful to clarify the function of 
international law. First, international law’s function is to 
attain an end state which is desired by those whose conduct is 
placed under the authority of law.269 Second, international law 
functions to bring about justice within a wide array of instances 
of human, state, and institutional interaction.270 One persistent 
threat is the detachment of this key function of international 
law from the non-instrumental concept of law and the tendency 
to instead view law purely as an instrument for policy, used to 
impose the will of the more powerful components of the 
international order (whether sovereign states, powerful 
multinational corporations, the ultra-rich, and so on).271 Third, 
international law functions to resolve transnational political,272 
economic,273 and social conflicts.274 It does this by establishing 
coherent boundaries as to what conduct people, states, and 
institutions can come to expect from one another.275 In this 
way, international law continually evolves by providing ways to 
establish a state of equilibrium in response to deviations from 
the norms that have been established.   
The rule of law is guaranteed in the international context 
only if those harmed by noncompliance possess some means of 
redress against those who have broken the rules.276 Here the 
 
 269. See Inaamul Haque & Ruxandra Burdescu, Monterrey Consensus on 
Financing for Development: Response Sought from International Economic 
Law 27 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 219, 239 (2004) (“The future of 
international law depends upon the allegiance it commands from those subject 
to it.”).  
 270. See Harold Hongju Koh, How Is International Human Rights Law 
Enforced?, 74 IND. L.J. 1397, 1399 (1999) (noting that one phase of the 
transnational legal process is “institutional interaction whereby global norms 
of international human rights law are debated, interpreted, and ultimately 
internalized by domestic legal systems.”).  
 271. See, e.g., Bruce Upbin, The 147 Companies That Control Everything, 
FORBES, Oct. 22, 2011, http://www.forbes.com/sites/bruceupbin/2011/10/22/the-
147-companies-that-control-everything/.  
 272. Eric Brahm, International Law, BEYOND INRACTABILITY, available at 
http://www.beyondintractability.org/bi-essay/international-law (last visited 
Oct. 10, 2012) (noting that the Inter-American Court of Rights has been an 
important moral voice, especially when Latin American states struggled with 
political transitions).  
 273. U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 3.  
 274. Id.  
 275. See, e.g., U.N. Charter art. 2.  
 276. What Is Reparation?, REDRESS, http://www.redress.org/what-is-
reparation/what-is-reparation (last visited Oct. 10, 2012) (explaining that 
reparation, an obligation of a wrongdoing party to redress the damage caused 
to an injured party, is a form of redress and applies in the context of 
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violation of law is considered an abuse of power.277 While the 
“vertical” sovereign abuse of power has traditionally been a 
central focus of rule of law conceptions, the idea of the rule of 
law can be expanded to encompass other “horizontal” abuses of 
power as well.278 After all, in civil matters, one party sues 
another private party and the gravamen of complaint is that 
the other private party, as a co-equal citizen, has broken the 
law.279 
This way of thinking avoids the problem of granting a 
monopoly to states to handle the enforcement of law. Whereas 
the idea of separation of powers has proved an effective balance 
to over-concentration of sovereign power, expanding the rule of 
law to other forms of governance provides new avenues for 
separation of power to gain currency in the global context.280  
Rule of law is an end state of affairs where law as a system 
of norms is deployed in a way that justifies its existence and 
authority over a community of persons.281 The rule of law is 
opposed to arbitrary use of power, regardless of whether that 
power is state or non-state.282 It entails that some measure of 
certainty obtains in society ,whether in the short or long term. 
A system of general norms enables people to foresee how they 
will interact, or chose not to interact, with other citizens and 
with institutions public and private.  
The discussion so far reflects that rule of law is not an all-
 
international law).  
 277. See, e.g., Guantanamo Bay: An Abuse of Power and a Violation of 
Human Rights, PEACES OF THE WORLD, http://peacesoftheworld.org/north-
america/guantanamo-bay-an-abuse-of-power-and-a-violation-of-human-rights/ 
(last visited Oct. 10, 2012).  
 278. John H. Knox, Horizontal Human Rights Law, 102 AM. J. INT’L L. 1, 1 
(2008).  
 279. See, e.g., Joe Burns, Copyright Questions and Answers, HTML 
GOODIES, http://www.htmlgoodies.com/beyond/reference/article.php 
/3472671/Copyright-Questions-and-Answers.htm (last visited Oct. 10, 2012) 
(using copyright violations as one example of when a civil lawsuit may be 
brought against a defendant alleged to have broken the law).  
 280. Separation of Powers in a Global Context, in JUDGES, TRANSITION AND 
HUMAN RIGHTS: ESSAYS IN MEMORY OF STEPHEN LIVINGSTONE (John Morison, 
Kieran McEvoy & Gordon Anthony eds. 2007). 
 281. John Gardner, Law and Morality, 3, available at 
http://users.ox.ac.uk/~lawf0081/pdfs/lawmoralityedited.pdf (“Law makes moral 
claims, and when it makes those claims sincerely it has moral aims, and when 
it succeeds in those aims it is morally justified law.”).  
 282. See READINGS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 20 (Keith Culver ed., 
Broadview Press, Ltd., 1999) (maintaining that rule of law curbs forms of 
arbitrary power).  
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or-nothing idea.283 Moreover, emerging global governance 
devices, like public-private collaboration, that blur traditional 
distinctions sanctified under “hard” public international law 
categorizations are not in themselves necessarily “good” or 
“bad” things.284 In each case it becomes important to scrutinize 
questions about whether a collaborative governance 
arrangement becomes a form of “corporatocracy,”285 whether 
checks and balances exist within the collaborative relationship 
to restrain despotism in private and non-governmental 
forms,286 whether the collaboration is a convenient shield for 
deflecting responsibility or passing off blame to the another 
party,287 whether NGOs (who often posture themselves as 
critics of other institutions) that are parties to the syndicate 
are themselves being held accountable,288 and whether a 
collaborative governance scheme is a front for “crony 
capitalism.”289 
 
II. GLOBAL ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE AND HUMAN 
RIGHTS 
A close examination of the correlation between business 
 
 283. See generally Thomas G. Weiss & Ramesh Thakur, GLOBAL 
GOVERNANCE AND THE UN: AN UNFINISHED JOURNEY (Ind. Univ. Press 2010). 
 284. Id. at 6 (saying that global governance can be “good, bad, or 
indifferent”). 
 285. See generally Charles P. Oman, Policy Competition for Foreign Direct 
Investment (April 1999), available at 
http://www.oecd.org/investment/guidelinesformultinationalenterprises/208993
6.pdf (discussing how corporations pit one government against another in 
location decisions, shedding light on the idea that some governments appear to 
be dominated by powerful corporations).  
 286. See, e.g., James Madison, FEDERALIST No. 51 (arguing that those who 
make law and those who enforce it should be separated in order to provide a 
check against law creators advancing their own agendas).  
 287. See, e.g., Nora Barrows-Friedman, Campaigners strategize refugee 
return during South America visit, JEWS FOR JUSTICE FOR PALESTINIANS (May 
6, 2012), http://jfjfp.com/?p=31467 (saying that a Palestinian “partner for 
peace” allows Israel to deflect any criticism through a combination of blaming 
Palestinians for not doing enough and pointing to the ongoing “peace process” 
charade).  
 288. Mallen Baker, The accountability of NGOs, MALLENBAKER.NET (Nov. 
16, 2003), http://www.mallenbaker.net/csr/page.php?Story_ID=1136.  
 289. See Vladimir Gelman, Russia’s crony capitalism: the swing of the 
pendulum, OD RUSSIA (Nov. 14, 2011), http://www.opendemocracy.net/od-
russia/vladimir-gelman/russia%E2%80%99s-crony-capitalism-swing-of-
pendulum; see also ROY MEDVEDEV, POST-SOVIET RUSSIA (George Shriver 
trans., 2000) (offering a useful historical view of the economic and political 
problems in Russia since August 1991). 
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and human rights in global economic governance is of vital 
importance. Human rights are of precious worth because they 
allow people to exercise free choice, safeguard their own 
interests, and safeguard those of others.290 
Human rights are at the heart of the United Nation’s 
efforts.291 They occupy center stage in the creation of company 
codes of conduct and constitute lodestars for civil society in 
rendering their interpretations of transnational enterprises’ 
responsibilities.292 There is a deep connection between the rule 
of law and human rights.293 Preserving and advancing human 
rights is one of the most basic obligations underlying the rule of 
law in both domestic and international contexts. Human rights 
provide a normative foundation for democratic governments 
around the world.294 
Today, transnational business enterprises are drivers of 
economic development at the local, regional, and global 
levels.295 The decisions rendered by corporations impact the 
welfare of people in numerous countries across the developing 
world, often in ways that are commensurate with or even 
greater than national governments.296 Indeed “there are few if 
any internationally recognized human rights that business 
cannot impact–or be perceived to impact–in some manner.”297 
 
 
 290. See TOM CAMPBELL, RIGHTS: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION 4 (2006) 
(noting that “rights offer security through a system of social and political 
entitlements” and “provide a basis for setting standards that apply to everyone 
in all societies and to every government, thus holding out the prospect of 
universal justice.”). 
 291. U.N. Human Rights Council, Rep. of the Working Grp. on the Issue of 
Human Rights and Transnational Corp. and Other Bus. Enter., U.N. DOC. 
A/HRC/20/29 (Apr. 10, 2012). 
 292. See, e.g., U.N. Secretary-General, Promotion and Protection of All 
Human Rights Civil, Political, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
Including the Right to Development, U.N. DOC. A/HRC/815 (April 7, 2008).  
 293. Gary L. McDowell & Stephen B. Presser, Foreword: Human Rights, 
The Rule of Law, And National Sovereignty, 2 NW. U. J. INT’L HUM. RTS. 1 
(2004).  
 294. See generally John O. McGinnis & Ilya Somin, Democracy and 
International Human Rights Law, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1739 (2009). 
 295. JOHN MADELEY, BIG BUSINESS, POOR PEOPLES: THE IMPACT OF 
TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS ON THE WORLD’S POOR (Palgrave Macmillian, 
1999).  
 296. See generally id. 
 297.  See, e.g., U.N. Secretary-General, Promotion and Protection of All 
Human Rights Civil, Political, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
Including the Right to Development, U.N. DOC. A/HRC/815 (April 7, 2008).  
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A. INSTRUMENTAL JUSTIFICATIONS FOR HUMAN RIGHTS 
Human rights discourse implicates the normative logic of 
the dyad of right and wrong. The inquiry behind that discourse 
aims at whether or not some value or principle is being upheld. 
When a framework for human rights is engaged, as when 
voluntary codes are instituted, human rights will trump 
outcome-aimed considerations.298 While an assertion could be 
made that human welfare will be improved by conduct violating 
rights of particular people affected by such conduct, this state 
of affairs cannot prevail when moral status is extended to 
human rights. The non-instrumental normative logic of human 
rights trumps the instrumental logic of consequentialism. 
Naturally, situations arise in which human rights, values, and 
principles diverge from other considerations taken to be 
important to business, such as profitability, efficiency, or 
sustainability objectives.   
Wherever human rights obligations are at issue, although 
they are often contestable in the sense that there may be no 
consensus on whether some action or activity is in line with 
respect for human rights, the rights themselves are not subject 
to negotiations and trade-offs.  
In the global context, rights discourse is sometimes 
perceived as the product of a parochial western culture out of 
sync with the wants and hopes of the bulk of the people on the 
planet.299 In the West, a rights-oriented discourse must 
confront skepticism that rights have not always advanced 
progressive aims.300 
As a result, a major challenge faces businesses concerning 
the pursuit of human rights standards. Sometimes this concern 
is veiled by the apparent eagerness with which firms inject 
human rights rhetoric into their codes of conduct and annual 
reports.301 Some scholars contend that, despite all of the 
sanctimonious rhetoric about social responsibility and 
sustainability, corporate human rights commitments are 
narrowly bound by instrumental aims that effectively curb 
 
 298. See Tom Campbell, A Human Rights Approach to Developing 
Voluntary Codes of Conduct for Multinational Corporations, 16 BUS. ETHICS 
Q. 255, 256 (2006) (citing RONDALD M. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 
269 (1978)).  
 299. TOM CAMPBELL, supra note 290, at 10.  
 300. Id.  
 301. See, e.g., IBM, 2011 Corporate Responsibility Summary, available at 
http://www.ibm.com/ibm/responsibility/2011/bin/downloads/IBM_Corp_Respon
sibility_Report_2011.pdf (last visited Oct. 11, 2012).  
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external stakeholder interests in order to fortify the power of 
large business enterprises.302 
On the one hand, transnational enterprises have become 
accustomed to maneuvering within the various constraints 
imposed by rule of law and to performing in locales where 
governments hold them to human rights standards.303 To be 
sure, being situated within a secure legal environment 
generally improves an enterprise’s ability to successfully 
conduct business.304 On the other hand, proposals to hold firms 
directly accountable for human rights violations in legal 
tribunals, as has been put forward by the United Nations Draft 
Norms, is typically opposed by industry associations such as 
the International Chamber of Commerce and the International 
Organization of Employers.305 Additionally, nation-states tend 
to restrict their commitments to human rights when they lend 
their support to investment and trade agreements that instead 
privilege respect for corporate rights.306 One noteworthy 
illustration of this dynamic can be found in stabilization 
agreements in which a transnational corporation and a 
government stipulate that the state will not make any changes 
in its laws that would elevate operating costs of the enterprise 
over the duration of a projected business project.307 
 
 302. See Subhabrata B. Banerjee, Corporate Social Responsibility: The 
Good, the Bad and the Ugly, 34 CRITICAL. SOC. 51–79 (2008). 
 303. Angela Walker, The Hidden Flaw in Kiobel: Under the Alien Tort 
Statute the Mens Rea Standard for Corporate Aiding and Abetting Is 
Knowledge, 10 NW. U. J. INT’L HUM. RTS. 119, 119 (2011).  
 304. See generally, Anthony D’Amato, Are Human Rights Good for 
International Business? 1 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 22 (1979).  
 305. Int’l Chamber of Commerce [IOC] and Int’l Org. of Employees [IOE], 
Joint Views of the IOE and ICC on the draft “Norms on the Responsibilities of 
Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with regard to 
Human Rights,” (arguing that the draft norms would undermine human 
rights, the business sector of society, and the right to development).  
 306. See Daniel Aguirre, Corporate Liability for Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights Revisited: The Failure of International Cooperation, 42 CAL. 
W. INT’L. L.J. 123, 145 (2011).  
 307. See Andrea Shemberg, Stabilisation Clauses and Human Rights: A 
Research Paper Conducted for the IFC and the United Nations Special 
Representative of the Secretary-General on Business and Human Rights 10 
(May 27, 2009), http://www.ifc.org/ifcext/enviro.nsf/AttachmentsByTitle/ 
p_StabilizationClausesandHumanRights/$FILE/Stabilization+Paper.pdf 
(examining whether stabilization clauses impact a state’s ability to keep its 
human rights obligations, and finding that “some stabilization clauses can be 
used to limit a state’s action to implement new social and environmental 
legislation to long-term investments”); Thomas W. Waelde & George Ndi, 
Stabilizing International Investment Commitments: International Law Versus 
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An illustration of an instrumental justification of profit 
maximization308 for the human rights responsibilities of 
business is the United Nations Global Compact, which proposes 
ten principles that responsible companies should observe.309 
Yet, a pronounced theme throughout the Global Compact 
Office’s commentary on those principles is the strategic 
advantage to be obtained from enhancing corporate reputation 
through observance of the principles, in the absence of any 
acknowledgement of the intrinsic moral value of corporate 
social responsibility.310 
Adopting such a non-normative approach to the Global 
Compact suggests that an instrumental profit maximization 
justification is sufficient to establish the moral norms that 
ought to direct corporate conduct to respect human rights. Only 
by showing the instrumental value of the Compact’s principles 
could one hope to convince companies to endorse the initiative 
and work toward the fulfillment of its requirements. 
Another illustration of instrumental justification for 
human rights appears in reports of John R. Ruggie, the Special 
Representative of the Secretary General of the United 
Nations.311 These reports lay out the groundwork for the 
 
Contract Interpretation, 31TEX. INT’L L.J. 215, 243 (1996) (indicating that such 
clauses are designed to set up a contractual mechanism of allocating the 
financial effect of political risk to the state enterprise).  
 308. See SONIA LABATT & RODNEY WHITE, ENVTL FIN. 301–08 (2002), 
(discussing the instrumentally-based justification of profit maximization as a 
central driver for socially responsible investment); United Nations 
Environment Program Finance Initiative (UNEPFI), Show Me the Money 4 
(2006), available at 
http://www.unepfi.org/fileadmin/documents/show_me_the_money.pdf (noting 
that the “first — and arguably for investors the most important — reason to 
integrate [SRI] issues is, simply, to make more money.”); Hal Brill, Jack Brill 
& Cliff Feingenbaum, INVESTING WITH YOUR VALUES: MAKING MONEY AND 
MAKING A DIFFERENCE (New Society Publishers, 1999) (arguing that the area 
of retail marketing provides further substantiation for the inclination to 
market SRI funds with an eye toward reducing risk coupled with the objective 
of generating returns that will outperform the market).  
 309. See Ten Principles, U.N. GLOBAL COMPACT, 
http://www.unglobalcompact.org/AboutTheGC/TheTenPrinciples/index.html 
(last visited Oct. 3, 2012).  
 310. See id.  
 311. Press Release, Secretary-General, Secretary-General Appoints John 
Ruggie of United States Special Representative on Issue of Human Rights, 
Transnational Corporations, Other Business Enterprises, U.N. Press Release 
SC/A/934 (Jul. 28, 2005) (explaining that John Ruggie was appointed by Kofi 
Annan, then Secretary General of the United Nations, to address questions 
concerning the human rights responsibilities of corporations with a view to 
formulating recommendations for consideration and adoption by the UN).  
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proposed UN framework to identify human rights 
responsibilities of transnational corporations and other 
business enterprises.312 One fundamental element of the 
framework is the principle that corporations have a 
responsibility to respect human rights in their operations 
whether compelled to do so by law or its enforcement.313 The 
proposed framework carries with it clear and significant 
implications for public policy and the strategic management of 
corporations doing business in global markets.314 It is 
particularly noteworthy that in setting forth his proposals, 
Ruggie nowhere appeals to or links his counsels to moral values 
or any ethical frame of reference.315  
Wesley Cragg puts the matter squarely as follows: 
[I]n advancing his proposals, the SRSG nowhere 
attempts to justify his recommendations by 
suggesting or arguing that the corporate 
responsibility to respect human rights is an 
ethical or moral responsibility and should be 
recognized as such by corporations themselves. 
Neither is there any attempt in the reports 
emerging from the work of the SRSG to explain 
or justify this aspect of the proposed 
Framework.316 
Ruggie asserts that the responsibility to respect human 
rights is grounded upon the social expectation associated with 
“a company’s social license to operate.”317 Neglecting to live up 
to such a social expectation may “subject companies to the 
courts of public opinion . . . and occasionally to charges in 
actual courts.”318 Failing to respect human rights could impose 
risks that might impact operations, harm companies’ 
reputations, and, by implication, negatively affect their bottom 
lines. 
Ruggie characterizes his approach to enunciating the 
 
 312. U.N. Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Protect, Respect 
and Remedy: A Framework for Business and Human Rights, U.N. DOC. 
A/HRC/8/5 (April 7, 2011) [hereinafter Protect, Respect and Remedy].  
 313. Id.  
 314. Id.  
 315. Id.  
 316. Wesley Cragg, Ethics, Enlightened Self-Interest, and the Corporate 
Responsibility to Respect Human Rights: A Critical Look at the Justificatory 
Foundations of the UN Framework, 22 BUS. ETHICS Q. 9, 10 (2012). 
 317. Protect, Respect and Remedy, supra note 312. 
 318. Id. 
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recommended framework as “principled pragmatism.”319 He 
does not specify just what this allusion to pragmatism might 
mean.320 Yet, the way he justifies the advices points to an 
underlying assumption that only by tying respect for human 
rights to bottom line and profit maximization concerns could 
business leaders in today’s world be reasonably expected to 
ratify and give effect to the proposed framework.  
An instrumental profit maximization justification for 
business responsibility toward human rights is, from an 
epistemological point of view, a moral justification grounded in 
instrumental thinking. This sort of instrumental rationality is, 
at the same time, premised upon a consequentialist logic that 
restricts global governance’s concern for human rights and 
principles such as those in the Global Compact to the 
instrumental role they play in business management. On the 
assumption that the purpose of shareholder-owned 
corporations is to maximize profits, then, if human rights are to 
exert an influence in management decision making, it must be 
because they can pave the way to firms’ maximizing profits. 
 
1. Instrumental View of CSR 
The logic of the instrumental case for human rights can be 
discerned to underlie an earlier and more general articulation 
of an instrumental case for CSR that developed beginning in 
the 1990s.321 Instrumental CSR stresses the value of corporate 
responsibility as a means of furthering the financial interests of 
a company.322 It is backed by the idea that responsible business 
conduct makes economic sense.323 According to the so-called 
“friendship” image of the relation between economics and 
 
 319. Id., ¶¶ 4-15. See also Nicola Jägers & Willem van Genugten, 
Corporations and Human Rights: Moving Beyond ‘Principled Pragmatism’ to 
‘Ruggie-Plus’ (March 1, 2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1844203. 
 320. Protect, Respect and Remedy, supra note 312. 
 321. See Lynn S. Paine, Does Ethics Pay? 10 BUS. ETHICS Q. 319 (2000) 
(noting the launching of “ethics programs, value initiatives, and community 
involvement activities” as evidence of the growing belief, during this period, 
that “ethics pays”); see generally DAVID VOGEL, supra note 5 (providing an 
analysis of the CSR movement and indicating that while the idea of CSR was 
not novel, the current global interest in the area was unprecedented); Gond, 
Palazzo & Basu, supra note 18, at 57–86.  
 322. See Ron Robins, Does Corporate Social Responsibility Increase 
Profits?, BUS. ETHICS (May 12, 2011), http://business-
ethics.com/2011/05/12/does-corporate-social-responsibility-increase-profits/ 
(saying that most company executives believe CSR can improve profits).  
 323. Id.  
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ethics, being ethical and attaining financial success are deemed 
to go hand in hand rather than remaining at a distance as 
contradictory ideals.324 The model is grounded on the premise 
that a convergence can be identified between economic and 
social values.325 The objective is to elucidate a plausible 
economic rationale behind “doing the right thing.”326 
There are two guises which the economic justification for 
CSR typically assumes: the negative and the positive business 
cases.327 The negative facet of the business case stresses the 
destructive potential that irresponsible business practices may 
unleash, causing diminution of economic value.328 It runs on 
the assumption that irresponsible practices will sooner or later 
be both uncovered and condemned by those stakeholder groups 
of firms that are necessary for firms’ financial successes.329 
Accordingly, corporate rectitude is viewed as promoting the 
objectives of risk management. Corporations that do the right 
thing are relieved from being obliged to pay large fines, 
forfeiting revenue, or suffering reputational penalties when 
malfeasance comes to light.330 Ethical conduct can also forestall 
more rigid and costly regulations from being imposed.331 
Moreover, building a culture of integrity and fair dealing cuts 
down on coordination, transaction, and monitoring costs.332 
 
 324. See Paine, supra note 321, at 319.  
 325. Joe Lawless, Why Should Your Business Should [sic] Care About 
Corporate Social Responsibility, TRIPLEPUNDIT (Sept. 20, 2011), 
http://www.triplepundit.com/2011/09/business-care-about-corporate-social-
responsibility/ (“Business can be both profitable and socially responsible.”). 
 326. Nicole Stempak, Doing the Right Thing: The Best Risk Prevention, 
BUSINESSFINANCE (June 16, 2011), http://businessfinancemag.com/article/ 
doing-right-thing-best-risk-prevention-0616 (“[E]thical conduct can be 
ingrained into the way they do business—and that can have an impact on the 
bottom line.”).  
 327. Paine, supra note 321, at 319; see generally JACKSON, supra note 162. 
 328. Paine, supra note 321, at 319 (indicating that the “negative aspect 
stresses risk management and cost avoidance.”). 
 329. Stacy Zeiger, Effects of a Lack of Ethics on a Business Environment, 
CHRON, http://smallbusiness.chron.com/effects-lack-ethics-business-
environment-23332.html (last visited Oct. 10, 2012) (discussing the potential 
effects of irresponsible practices on small businesses).  
 330. The Importance of Being Ethical, INC., 
http://www.inc.com/articles/2000/11/14278.html (last visited Oct. 4, 2012).  
 331. See JACKSON, supra note 162, at 15; Paine, supra note 321, at 320. 
 332. See UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL TRADE ADMINISTRATION, 
BUSINESS ETHICS: A MANUAL FOR MANAGING A RESPONSIBLE BUSINESS 
ENTERPRISE IN EMERGING MARKET ECONOMIES 23 (2004) (“By providing 
employees clear guidelines on how to conduct day-to-day business in 
compliance with laws and ethics through a business ethics program, the RBE 
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Instead, it promotes cooperation, eases conflict, and fosters 
processes of contracting.333 
By contrast, the positive side of the business case stresses 
CSR’s ability to contribute benefits.334 Thus, ethical business 
conduct thwarts reputational costs and produces tangible 
reputational benefits.335 A reputation based on responsibility, 
reliability, and trust may help firms attract and retain talent in 
the employment market, generate repeat business, reduce the 
cost of capital, solidify customer loyalty, magnify advertising 
impact, strengthen bargaining power, and boost investor 
confidence.336 Finally, a corporate culture of integrity often 
stimulates enhanced productivity and unleashes creativity and 
innovation within firms’ workforces.337 
Research on the business case for corporate responsibility 
divides into two streams: empirical and normative.338 Empirical 
research purporting to buttress the business case strives to 
prove positive correlations between responsible business 
conduct and financial success.339 One meta study set out to 
demonstrate statistical linkages between corporate social 
performance and corporate financial performance.340 
Incorporating data across various industries and study 
contexts, the study concluded that “corporate virtue in the form 
of social responsibility and, to a lesser extent, environmental 
responsibility is likely to pay off.”341 
This is not to say that empirical research establishing 
positive connections between corporate responsibility and 
 
[responsible business enterprise] can reduce transaction costs.”).  
 333. See Paine, supra note 321, at 320. 
 334. See generally Jackson, supra note 162; LRN, Ethics and Compliance 
Risk Management: Improving Business Performance and Fostering a Strong 
Ethical Culture Through a Sustainable Process, at 2, available at 
http://www.ethics.org/files/u5/LRNRiskManagement.pdf.  
 335. LRN, Ethics and Compliance Risk Management: Improving Business 
Performance and Fostering a Strong Ethical Culture Through a Sustainable 
Process, at 2, available at 
http://www.ethics.org/files/u5/LRNRiskManagement.pdf.  
 336. See JACKSON, supra note 162, at 12–15. 
 337. Id. at 129. 
 338. See Marc T. Jones, Disrobing the Emperor: Mainstream CSR Research 
and Corporate Hegemony (Aug. 2008), available at 
http://www.crrconference.org/downloads/jones.pdf (last visited Oct. 10, 2012).  
 339. Robert C. McMurrian & Erika Matulich, Building Customer Value 
and Profitability with Business Ethics, 4 J. BUS. & ECON. RES. 11 (2006).  
 340. Mark Orlitzky, Frank L. Schmidt, & Sara L. Rynes, Corporate Social 
and Financial Performance: A Meta-analysis, 24 ORG. STUD. 403 (2003).  
 341. Id.  
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financial performance is free from attack by skeptics. Some 
skeptics are quick to highlight difficulties associated with the 
operationalization of social and financial performance, which 
may call for a qualification of findings.342 Further studies raise 
critical concerns over measurement limitations inherent in 
attempts to gain quantitative confirmation relative to 
corporations’ pursuits of socially responsibility behaviors.343 
In light of such questions, Lynn S. Paine offers this 
assessment of the status of the business case:  
While ethics and economics are mutually 
supportive in many respects, the economic case 
for corporate ethics goes only so far. It is wishful 
thinking to suppose otherwise. Even when cast 
in general tendencies rather than axiomatic 
truths, the case leaves wide berth for divergence 
between what is good and what is profitable.344  
Even empirical studies supporting the business case may 
be predicated upon their own normative assumptions.345 In the 
eyes of David Vogel, the supposedly empirical assertion that 
some companies attain financial reward as a consequence of 
their responsible conduct lends little comfort to proponents of 
CSR:“The reason they have placed so much importance on 
‘proving’ that CSR pays, is because they want to demonstrate, 
first, that behaving more responsibly is in the self-interest of 
all firms, and second, that CSR always makes business 
sense.”346  
Thus, in Vogel’s estimation, advocates of CSR set out to 
tout economic success as the raison d’etre for business 
enterprises to commit themselves to a path of corporate social 
responsibility.347 Yet, taking such a normative angle in order to 
prop up the instrumentalist rationale for CSR meets with some 
disapproval from the standpoint of moral philosophy.348 Paine 
 
 342. Id. at 403 (citing, among other studies, Wood and Jones’s finding that 
clear causal patterns in this area have been elusive). 
 343. See Sandra A. Waddock & Samual B. Graves, The Corporate Social 
Performance-Financial Performance Link, 18 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 303, 304 
(1997) (noting that CSP is difficult to measure because it “is a multi-
dimensional construct with behaviors ranging across a wide variety of 
inputs.”). See generally DAVID VOGEL, supra note 5, at 29–33. 
 344. Paine, supra note 321, at 324–25. 
 345. DAVID VOGEL, supra note 5. 
 346. Id. at 34.  
 347. Id. 
 348. See, e.g., Paine, supra note 321.  
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questions the underlying logic of instrumentalist justification 
by framing the terms of debate as follows: assuming that 
businesses operate responsibly based purely on the 
instrumentalist explanation that ethics is profitable, what 
would logically follow if it turns out that ethics does not pay 
after all?349 The crux of the matter may be stated as follows:  
The intellectual currents propelling the “ethics 
pays” argument conceal a dangerous undertow. 
On the surface, ethics appears to be gaining 
importance as a basis for reasoning and 
justification. At a deeper level, however, it is 
being undermined. For implicit in the appeal to 
economics as a justification for ethics is 
acceptance of economics as the more 
authoritative rationale. Rather than being a 
domain of rationality capable of challenging 
economics, ethics is conceived only as a tool of 
economics.350  
 
2. Instrumental Reasoning within the Human Rights 
Milieu 
The business case mode of justification has been 
transferred from the CSR discourse into the human rights 
domain. The UN Framework which now serves as the focal 
point in the business and human rights debate is emblematic of 
this trend.351 
Indeed, the heightened public sensitivity toward corporate 
misdeeds combined with readily available and shared 
information have raised the stakes for corporations to engage 
in irresponsible activity. This may be particularly so with 
regard to “moral felonies,” occurrences of severe malfeasance 
connected with basic human rights.352  
The long-term reputational ramifications of a company 
being associated with acute human rights violations can be 
substantial and protracted. For example, Shell continues to pay 
the price for complying with the Nigerian government in its 
execution of Ken Saro-Wiwa and nine other opponents of the 
 
 349. See id. at 327. 
 350. See id. at 327. 
 351. Protect, Respect and Remedy, supra note 312.  
 352. See JACKSON supra note 162, at 151, 166-67 (noting that corporations 
are held to high moral standards, and providing a guide for evaluating good 
and bad behavior). 
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Nigerian government’s military régime.353  
Companies heavily invested in their brands are mindful of 
such hazards. For example, Apple’s advocacy for better work 
conditions at its Chinese subcontractor’s plants is illustrative. 
Following mounting public backlash from highly publicized 
reports of employee suicides and dismal working conditions at 
the workshops of its supplier, Foxconn, Apple joined the Fair 
Labor Association.354 Apple asked the Fair Labor Association to 
investigate Foxconn’s factories engaged in manufacturing 
Apple merchandise.355 As a result of the investigation, Foxconn 
pledged to pursue demonstrable goals concerning improved pay 
and work conditions at its facilities.356 The concord is widely 
regarded as having contributed to a positive and enduring 
makeover of the manufacturing scene in China.357  
A centering of discourse regarding the appropriateness and 
limitations of instrumental logic in the field of business and 
human rights is called for in the current academic climate 
wherein views are moving away from the traditional 
assumption that, from both a legal and political perspective, 
the protection of human rights is an exclusive concern of 
governments.358 Corporations are no longer considered immune 
from shouldering direct human rights obligations, save what 
was prescribed by law.359 Indeed, not only was human rights 
discourse largely absent from ascriptions of CSR, the field of 
CSR was itself traditionally conceived of as being mainly 
addressed to voluntary business behavior.360 In other words, 
 
 353. CHRISTOPHER L. AVERY, BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN A TIME OF 
CHANGE 7 (2000).  
 354. Apple Joins Fair Labor Association, PRNEWSWIRE (Jan. 13, 2012).  
 355. Don Reisinger, Apple Launches Fair Labor Inspections of Foxconn, 
CNET (Feb. 23, 2012, 5:44 AM PST), http://news.cnet.com/8301-13506_3-
57376431-17/apple-launches-fair-labor-inspections-of-foxconn/.  
 356. See JACKSON supra note 162, at 151, 166-67 (noting that corporations 
are held to high moral standards, and providing a guide for evaluating good 
and bad behavior). 
 357. Charles Duhigg & Steven Greenhouse, Electronic Giant Vowing 
Reforms in China Plants, N.Y. TIMES, March 29, 2012, at A1. 
 358. See, e.g., Promoting Peace & Protecting Human Rights: Business 
Operations in Conflict Zones, UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE 
INTERNATIONAL NETWORK FOR ECONOMICS AND CONFLICTS (Jan. 8, 2012), 
http://inec.usip.org/blog/2012/jan/08/promoting-peace-protecting-human-
rights-business-operations-conflict-zones (“[C]ompanies can proactively build 
peace and protect human rights . . . .”).  
 359. See id.  
 360. Comm’n of the European Comtys., Implementing the Partnership for 
Growth and Jobs: Making Europe a Pole of Excellence on Corporate Social 
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CSR was thought of as being the responsibility that companies 
assume on voluntary bases beyond mere legal compliance.361 By 
contrast, human rights comprise the most elemental moral 
entitlements of human beings,362 and are therefore correlative 
to equally fundamental moral obligations. Such a fundamental 
moral imperative attached to human rights is discordant with 
the sort of discretionary approach to responsibility that has 
been characteristic of conventional accounts of CSR.363 It is 
only recently that CSR discourse has transitioned beyond a 
voluntaristic paradigm.364 Consequently, human rights are 
coming to occupy a more pronounced position in CSR.365 
The apparent normative disconnect between an 
understanding of human rights as basic moral imperatives and 
an alternative understanding of CSR as a voluntary and 
discretionary undertaking has accentuated the allure of 
instrumental justifications for corporate responsibility toward 
human rights. A substitution of the non-instrumentally 
grounded vocabulary of moral obligation with that of the 
instrumentally-based language of economic incentives has 
tended to perpetuate corporate approaches to human rights 
questions without abandoning the presumptions of 
voluntariness. The dominant assumption has been that 
companies neglecting to undertake human rights commitments 
voluntarily will do so to their own financial peril.366 
Despite the prevalent use of instrumental logic to frame 
 
Responsibility, March 22, 2006, at 2. 
 361. Florian Wettstein & Sandra Waddock, Voluntary or Mandatory: That 
Is (Not) the Question, 6:3 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR WIRTSCHAFTS-UND 
UNTERNEHMENSETHIK 304, 304 (2005) (referencing the “traditional” view of 
CSR as a voluntary affair for businesses).  
 362. John Tasioulas, The Moral Reality of Human Rights, UNESCO 
POVERTY PROJECT PHILOSOPHY SEMINAR (March 2003), available at 
http://www.c3mundos.org/files/Tasioulas%20%282004%29%20The%20Moral%
20Reality%20of%20Human%20Rights.pdf.  
 363. See generally Wettsetin & Waddock, supra note 361. 
 364. See European Comm’n, A renewed EU strategy 2011-14 for Corporate 
Social Responsibility, October 25, 2011, at 4 (noting that the change in 
strategy resulted from public distrust of corporate entities following the 
economic crisis). 
 365. See generally Geoffrey Chandler, The Evolution of the Business and 
Human Rights Debate, in BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS: DILEMMAS AND 
SOLUTIONS 22–32 (Rory Sullivan ed., 2003); Geoffrey Chandler Keynote 
Address: Crafting a Human Rights Agenda for Business in HUMAN RIGHTS 
STANDARDS AND THE RESPONSIBILITY OF TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS 39–
45 (M. K. Addo ed., 1999). 
 366. See Higginbotham, supra note 192. 
JACKSON - Global Economic Governance (22 MINN J INTL L 71 (Winter 2013)) 2/21/2013  1:48 PM 
128 MINNESOTA JOURNAL OF INT’L LAW  [Vol 22:1 
 
voluntaristic and discretionary explanations for corporate 
human rights responsibility, it is especially within the context 
of human rights that the defects of instrumental justifications 
for CSR can be clearly discerned. 
 
3. Cracks in Foundations of Negative Business Case for 
Human Rights 
A negative business case for business responsibility to 
respect human rights emphasizes the anticipated negative 
public repercussions from corporate contraventions of human 
rights and, accordingly, the reputational damage and adverse 
bearing on a firm’s social license to function that result from it. 
The reasoning behind the negative business case argument 
is predicated upon the idea of moral blame.367 If customers did 
not assign any blame to organizations for malfeasance, no 
reason would exist for customers to discontinue patronizing 
organizations’ products or services. Absent any ascription of 
culpability, firms would not be in positions to sustain any 
reputational harm. Absent any imputation of moral wrongdoing 
by investors, they would have no motive to cease investing in it. 
The various costs and risks flowing from irresponsible business 
conduct only come about for companies when companies are 
deemed blameworthy for something. The logic underpinning 
the negative business case for responsibility to respect human 
rights assumes the presence of some moral blame, which is 
enunciated and disseminated informally by way of the “court of 
public opinion” in the global context.368  
Blame is ordinarily accompanied by moral indignation. 
Society typically impugns moral actors, whether people or 
organizations, if it thinks that their acts or omissions can be 
properly categorized as unethical and if it believes their 
offenses toward moral actors’ conduct are warranted.369 Moral 
blame involves treating the moral agent targeted for blame as 
having a reason to act ethically but yet failing to do so.370 
 
 367. The business of business is responsible business, UNIVERSITY OF 
STELLENBOSCH BUSINESS SCHOOL (Dec. 1, 2011), 
http://www.usb.ac.za/NewsAndEvents/FullNewsItem.aspx?NewsItem=3801&
RefFunctionality=inthenews (noting that responsibility is often associated 
with apportioning blame). 
 368. See Protect, Respect and Remedy, supra 312. 
 369. See Holly Smith, Culpable Ignorance, 92 PHIL. REV. 543–571 (1983) 
(discussing how people assess the culpability or blameworthiness of an actor).  
 370. BERNARD WILLIAMS, MAKING SENSE OF HUMANITY AND OTHER 
PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS 42 (1995). 
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Society assigns blame to moral agents when it thinks that they 
should have acted differently.371 In this way, blameworthiness 
presupposes logically prior and non-instrumental 
responsibility. That is because society does not lay blame for 
conduct that is simply discretionary.372 In other words, laying 
blame amounts to a characteristic response within an ethical 
system for an actor’s failure to satisfy some moral obligation.373  
In terms of logical inference then, it is a moral justification 
rather an economic one that carries the day for prescription of 
business conduct.374 Correspondingly, businesses shoulder 
duties to respect human rights not due to anticipated 
reputational risks of non-compliance or to any projected cost 
savings, but instead because they carry a moral obligation to do 
so. Therefore, to proffer an instrumentally-oriented business 
case for such an obligation is, normatively speaking, beside the 
point. The ground of moral obligations is non-instrumental. 
Such obligations ought to be satisfied independently of any 
calculations of financial returns. In other words, even if the 
business case argument were to somehow collapse, the 
obligations would still need to be followed. In the final analysis, 
the business case argument gets swallowed up by the very 
moral presuppositions upon which it stands.375 
Arguably, this is the situation regarding human rights. As 
Kant, John Stuart Mill and Onora O’Neill contend, obligations 
that correlate to rights amount to perfect obligations.376 Perfect 
obligations are determinate in reference to both their 
addressees and to their duty-holders.377 They specify exactly 
what is owed.378 As situated within the sphere of justice, as 
 
 371. Id.  
 372. See id. at 177. 
 373. Id.  
 374. See PETER ULRICH, INTEGRATIVE ECONOMIC ETHICS: FOUNDATIONS OF 
A CIVILIZED MARKET ECONOMY 106 (2008) (noting that the safeguarding of 
moral rights is more important than the safeguarding of economic agents’ 
private interests in the employment of their resources in a way that is most 
efficient for them). 
 375. See Andrew C. Khourny, Blameworthiness and Wrongness, 45 VALUE 
INQUIRY 135–146 (2011) (urging the rejection of the assumption that 
blameworthiness presupposes wrongfulness). 
 376. IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 77 (M. Gregor trans., 
Cambridge Univ. Press 1996); MILL, supra note 215, at 47; ONORA O’NEILL, 
TOWARDS JUSTICE AND VIRTUE: A CONSTRUCTIVE ACCOUNT OF PRACTICAL 
REASONING 128–41 (Cambridge Univ. Press 1996).  
 377. O’Neill, supra note 376, at 129–30, 147. 
 378. Id.  
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opposed to the realm of utility, perfect obligations can be 
demanded by correlative rights-holders and are consequently 
morally owed by the respective duty-bearers.379 Therefore, 
carrying these kinds of obligations is something that arises 
independently of any anticipated economic payoff that might 
ensue from satisfying these obligations. 
A critic might allege that the negative business case for 
human rights responsibility need not assume that any deeper 
moral obligations exist. Instead, it only needs to take into 
account the perception of such obligations for business. Here 
the source of blame rests upon descriptive social expectations 
held concerning the human rights conduct of business. 
“[B]roader scope of the responsibility to respect is defined by 
social expectations—as part of what is sometimes called a 
company’s social license to operate.”380  
However, even if blame is pegged upon social expectations 
instead of moral obligation, ultimately instrumental business 
case arguments seek to shore up a case for human rights 
responsibility. Doing so means equating responsibility as a 
moral category with social expectations. The normative logic 
underlying this argument is that the human rights 
responsibilities of business are defined by and justified with 
reference to social expectations. Not meeting these 
expectations, then, is a failure to meet a moral responsibility 
and, from this perspective, is the source for justified moral 
blame.381 Blame presupposes at least the assumption by the 
originator that blame is warranted.382 Thus, any argument that 
instrumentalizes blame as a normative force for regulating 
behavior logically assumes that some justification for blame 
exists in the first place.383 
Thus, the problem is not so much that the business case 
argument bypasses morality but that it leans on a conventional 
 
 379. Id. at 128. 
 380. Protect, Respect and Remedy, supra note 312, ¶ 54. 
 381. See Smith, supra note 369, at 543–571 (discussing how people assess 
the culpability or blameworthiness of an actor); BERNARD WILLIAMS, MAKING 
SENSE OF HUMANITY AND OTHER PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS 42 (1995). 
 382. See Smith, supra note 381, at 543–571 (discussing how people assess 
the culpability or blameworthiness of an actor); BERNARD WILLIAMS, MAKING 
SENSE OF HUMANITY AND OTHER PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS 42 (1995). 
 383. See Smith, supra note 381, at 543–571 (discussing how people assess 
the culpability or blameworthiness of an actor); BERNARD WILLIAMS, MAKING 
SENSE OF HUMANITY AND OTHER PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS 42 (1995). 
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or positivist conception of morality.384 While social expectations 
may serve as general guides for moral conduct and may provide 
rough indications of morality, they do not on their own 
constitute reliable justificatory bases for morality.385 The 
widespread acceptance of the institution of slavery in the 
antebellum United States illustrates how social expectations 
are not necessarily congruent with, and indeed can sharply 
diverge from, human rights standards.386 Generally, the 
descriptive logic of social expectations (“is”) is an insufficient 
basis from which to derive normative prescriptions of ethics 
(“ought”).387 To do so is to commit the naturalistic fallacy.388 
Instead, the legitimacy of social expectations must be secured 
on the basis of normative logic itself, and is thereby still subject 
to further ethical scrutiny. In summary, the reason for the 
criticism of instrumental business case reasoning is that its 
logical foundation is formed from a faulty understanding of 
morally justified responsibility.  
Alternatively, a critic might allege that society can 
conveniently eliminate all references to moral responsibility 
from the business case scenario such that respecting human 
rights are reduced to a “business consideration” assessed 
 
 384. See Andreas Georg Scherer and Guido Palazzo, Toward a Political 
Conception of Corporate Responsibility: Business and Society Seen from a 
Habermasian Perspective, 32(4) ACAD. MGMT. REV. 1096, 1099 (2007) 
(critiquing positivist portrayals of corporate responsibility).  
 385. See generally O’Neill, supra note 375, at 187 (describing how virtues 
like justice and fairness may be imbedded in social traditions and culture, and 
how they may alternatively be perverted by cultures of corruption). 
 386. Slavery, Servitude, Forced Labour and Similar Institutions and 
Practices Convention of 1926 (Slavery Convention of 1926), 60 L.N.T.S. 253, 
entered into force Mar. 9, 1927.  
 387. DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATIRE 469 (L.A. Selby-Bigge 
ed., 2nd ed. 1978) (“In every system of morality, which I have hitherto met 
with, I have always remark’d, that the author proceeds for some time in the 
ordinary way of reasoning, and establishes the being of a God, or makes 
observations concerning human affairs; when of a sudden I am surpriz’d to 
find, that instead of the usual copulations of propositions, is, and is not, I meet 
with no proposition that is not connected with an ought, or an ought not. This 
change is imperceptible; but is, however, of the last consequence. For as this 
ought, or ought not, expresses some new relation or affirmation, ’tis necessary 
that it shou’d be observ’d and explain’d; and at the same time that a reason 
should be given, for what seems altogether inconceivable, how this new 
relation can be a deduction from others, which are entirely different from it.”).  
 388. See generally G. E. MOORE, PRINCIPIA ETHICA 10 (Cambridge Univ. 
Press 1959) (describing the “naturalistic fallacy” as the tendency of 
philosophers to think that when they name other properties they were 
actually defining good that those properties, in fact, were simply not “other” 
but absolutely and entirely the same with goodness). 
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entirely by its bottom line impact.389 However, if respecting 
human rights is a non-moral choice made on a functionalist 
basis and dictated solely by financial payoff, then the logic of 
such a variety of business cases turns out to be circular, 
tantamount to constructing a business case for selling goods 
and services, that is, for doing business itself. 
 
4. Assessment of Positive Business Case for Human 
Rights 
The positive business case emphasizes the reputational 
advantages, stepped-up sales, or enhanced productivity 
resulting from corporations pursuing responsible conduct.  
Considered within the context of global economic 
governance and human rights, this argument is suspect. 
Whereas the negative business case revolves around assigning 
blame, the positive business case revolves around granting 
acclaim.390 In the same way that blameworthiness assumes 
some prior violation of moral duty, praiseworthiness assumes 
some prior achievement beyond moral duty.391 Normally, 
society does not extend commendation to people or companies 
merely for satisfying their obligations,392 unless there was little 
trust for those people or companies in the first place. This 
suggests that, from a moral point of view, tribute rests within 
the realms of the supererogatory and what is ethically 
discretionary.393  
Framing a positive business case for human rights would 
imply that for corporations to respect human rights is above 
and beyond the call of duty. However, this assertion rests on 
the assumption that there is no fundamental moral obligation 
 
 389. But see James Fieser, Do Businesses Have Moral Obligations Beyond 
What the Law Requires?, 15 J. BUS. ETHICS 457 (1996) (criticizing the view 
that morality in business can be derived from the profit motivation).  
 390. See generally O’Neill, supra note 376, at 209 (providing an example of 
praiseworthy action by describing how “saints and heroes are admired because 
they fulfill quite ordinary ethical requirements, but do so with super-
abundance”). 
 391. See generally id. 
 392. See id. (“It is hard to see how institutions could achieve 
superabundant justice: justice is a matter of what is due, and going beyond 
justice is not more just.”). 
 393. Sandra Waddock & Neil Smith, Relationships: The Real Challenge of 
Corporate Global Citizenship, 105(1) BUS. AND SOC’Y REVIEW 47, 47–62 (“Too 
much of the time, when we think about . . . corporate responsibility, we think 
about it as a discretionary responsibility.”).  
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for businesses to do so.394 Implicitly, the positive business case 
situates respect for human rights within the realm of 
supererogation rather than within the realm of what is morally 
owed.395 In other words, it presupposes that respecting human 
rights is discretionary rather than obligatory.396  
Taking that stance on the responsibility to respect 
contradicts the nature of human rights as basic moral 
entitlements of human beings. Human rights protect the most 
fundamental freedoms that define autonomy of intentional, 
moral persons.397 Human rights are possessed by humans 
simply by virtue of being human.398 Understood as moral 
entitlements, human rights are commonly acknowledged as 
universal and equal rights.399 In other words, all humans ought 
to enjoy them regardless of who those humans are, where those 
humans come from, or what those humans believe. Human 
rights define and protect the fundamental equality of all 
human beings in terms of moral worth and their dignity as 
moral persons.400 However, respect for people’s dignity and 
thus for their most basic human rights is owed to all people 
unconditionally.401 Respect for human rights is a matter of 
justice rather than one of beneficence.402  
Simply meeting the most fundamental obligations of 
justice warrants no praise. Rather, the fulfillment of such 
 
 394. See O’Neill, supra note 376, at 209 (“It is hard to see how institutions 
could achieve superabundant justice: justice is a matter of what is due, and 
going beyond justice is not more just.”). 
 395. Id. at 206 (supererogatory conduct is “action that exceeds the demands 
of duty, yet is ethically admirable”); Kant, supra note 376, at 42, 52 
(supererogation permits some latitude for free choice).  
 396. See Kevin T. Jackson, Global Distributive Justice and the Corporate 
Duty to Aid, 12 J. BUS. ETHICS 547 (1993) (arguing that even a multinational 
corporation’s obligation to provide assistance to those deprived of basic rights, 
understood by some scholars to fall within the domain of the supererogatory, 
can be properly interpreted as a prima facie moral obligation of international 
justice).  
 397. See generally Tom Campbell, Moral Dimensions of Human Rights, in 
HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE MORAL RESPONSIBILITIES OF CORPORATE AND 
PUBLIC SECTOR ORGANISATIONS 12 (Tom Campbell & Seumas Miller eds., 
2004) (describing the nature and function of human rights). 
 398. JACK DONNELLY, UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN THEORY AND 
PRACTICE 1 (Cornell Univ. Press 2003); JAMES GRIFFIN, ON HUMAN RIGHTS 2 
(Oxford Univ. Press 2008).  
 399. Campbell, supra note 397. 
 400. Griffin, supra note 398, at 31–33. 
 401. Id. at 31–33. 
 402. Mill, supra note 376, at 59. 
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obligations is a basic expectation addressed broadly to all 
participants in the global governance arena, and applies a 
fortiori to business enterprises because of their extensive 
power, influence, and economic resources.403 Arguing for a 
positive business case for the responsibility to respect human 
rights confuses categories of normative logic and signals a 
potential threat to the very concept of human rights. Implying 
that respecting human rights is a praiseworthy endeavor 
obscures the fundamental nature of human rights as ethical 
imperatives and relegates them to the province of benevolence 
or moral discretion.404 
 
5. Responsibilities of Collaborative Governance Régimes 
for Human Rights 
Correlative to any basic right are three kinds of duties: the 
duty to avoid depriving, the duty to protect from deprivation, 
and the duty to aid the deprived.405 Alternatively stated in a 
way that is concordant with the language of contemporary 
global governance initiatives, this triad of obligations could be 
referred to as the duty to respect human rights, the duty to 
protect human rights, and the duty to realize human rights 
where they have been violated or never been fulfilled. For a 
right to be fully respected, all three of these duties must be 
satisfied.406 Therefore, the question naturally arises as to just 
whose duty it is to respect, protect, and realize basic rights.  
Of the three types of duty, the duty to respect human 
rights appears to be the least controversial. Because it 
prescribes a universal duty, all moral actors are equally 
obligated by it.407 In other words, the duty not to violate human 
rights holds for all equally, in the same degree, and it holds for 
all times. However, it is harder to reckon with the other two 
kinds of duties. Both require some positive action and are 
accordingly particular rather than universal. They obligate 
some, but not all, moral actors at varying degrees and times. 
This means that respecting rights entails some division of 
 
 403. See O’Neill, supra note 376, at 209 (“It is hard to see how institutions 
could achieve superabundant justice: justice is a matter of what is due, and 
going beyond justice is not more just.”). 
 404. Id. at 206. 
 405. HENRY SHUE, BASIC RIGHTS: SUBSISTENCE, AFFLUENCE, AND U.S. 
FOREIGN POLICY 52 (Princeton Univ. Press 1996).  
 406. Id. at 53. 
 407. See generally Griffin, supra note 398, at 101 (implying that human 
rights impose universal duties by referring to them as “doubly universal”). 
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moral labor.408 It necessitates a fusion of different actors and 
institutions joining forces to add their respective contributions 
to the governance mix. In the global economic governance 
context, this means that determinations need to be made about 
how obligations differ between nation-states, 
intergovernmental organizations, business enterprises, NGOs, 
and other elements of civil society.409 Each element of civil 
society is unable to accomplish it alone, but elements can pool 
their capabilities within targeted collaborative undertakings. 
The ideal of satisfying human rights in all their normative 
features remains a challenging collective undertaking for 
economic participants.  
In the context of global economic governance, particularly 
in light of the variant forms of collaborative governance 
discussed in section one of this article, corporate responsibility 
stands in need of being re-imagined as global collaborative 
responsibility.410 An interpretation of global collaborative 
responsibility looks beyond effects of the solitary activities of 
economic participants and considers the peculiar power and 
influence that can be achieved from collaboration with fellow 
actors and institutions as a criterion of international legal and 
moral responsibility.411 In this connection, Kenneth Goodpaster 
contends that “even if a company does not have a categorical 
responsibility, a responsibility to resolve the moral challenge on 
its own, it can still have a qualified responsibility to make an 
effort—or to participate in the efforts of others in seeking a 
collaborative resolution.”412 He posits that “[t]he significance of 
a given threat to human dignity or justice in the community 
 
 408. Shue, supra note 405.  
 409. See THOMAS DONALSON, THE ETHICS OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 
73–75 (Oxford Univ. Press 1989) (setting out a scheme for dividing 
responsibilities between governments, corporations, and private individuals).  
 410. David Held & Anthony McGrew, The Great Globalization Debate: An 
Introduction, in THE GLOBAL TRANSFORMATION READER: AN INTRODUCTION 
TO THE GLOBALIZATION DEBATE 1, 7 (David Held & Anthony McGrew eds., 
Polity Press 2000) (globalization poses a challenge for “territorial principle of 
modern social and political organization”). See also, Virginia Held, Can a 
Random Collection of Individuals Be Morally Responsible? 67 J. PHIL. 471 
(1970) (arguing that under some conditions even a random assembly of moral 
agents can be held responsible for failure to act as a group).  
 411. See generally Kenneth E. Goodpaster, Corporate Responsibility and Its 
Constituents, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF BUSINESS ETHICS 126, 126–27 
(George G. Brenkert & Tom L. Beauchamp eds., Oxford Univ. Press 2010) 
(describing three distinct levels of responsibility: individual, corporate, and 
societal). 
 412. Id. at 147. 
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might raise our reasonable expectations of a corporation’s 
responsibility, even if we acknowledge that, in the end, we are 
dealing with a qualified responsibility.”413  
A variety of views treat both the foundations of qualified 
positive responsibility and the outer boundaries of qualified 
positive responsibility. Scholars hailing from disciplines of 
law,414 moral and political philosophy,415 and business ethics 416 
approach the question from the standpoints of social 
connection,417 Rawlsian duty of aid,418 corporate duty of 
assistance,419 or the margins of property rights.420 A common 
contention is that fair apportionment of responsibility421 rises 
in proportion to an agent’s abilities,422 capacities,423 power,424 
 
 413. Id. 
 414. See David Bilchitz, Do Corporations Have Positive Fundamental 
Rights Obligations? 57 THEORIA 1 (2010); Justine Nolan & Luke Taylor 
Corporate Responsibility for Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Rights in 
Search of a Remedy? 87 J. BUS. ETHICS 433 (2009); Stephan Wood, The Case 
for Leverage-Based Corporate Human Rights Responsibility, 22 BUS. ETHICS 
Q. 63 (2012). 
 415. See Michael Green, Institutional Responsibility for Moral Problems, in 
GLOBAL RESPONSIBILITIES: WHO MUST DELIVER ON HUMAN RIGHTS? 117 (A. 
Kuper ed., Routledge 2005); David Miller, Distributing Responsibilities, in 
GLOBAL RESPONSIBILITIES: WHO MUST DELIVER ON HUMAN RIGHTS? 95 (A. 
Kuper ed., Routledge 2005).  
 416. MICHAEL SANTORO, PROFITS AND PRINCIPLES: GLOBAL CAPITALISM 
AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN CHINA (Cornell Univ. Press 2000); MICHAEL SANTORO, 
CHINA 2020: HOW WESTERN BUSINESS CAN – AND SHOULD – INFLUENCE 
SOCIAL AND POLITICAL CHANGE IN THE COMING DECADE (Cornell Univ. Press 
2009); Nien-hê Hsieh, The Obligations of Transnational Corporations: 
Rawlsian Justice and the Duty of Assistance, 14 BUS. ETHICS Q. 643 (2004). 
 417. See Iris Young, From Guilt to Solidarity: Sweatshops and Political 
Responsibility, 50 DISSENT 39 (2003); Iris Young, Responsibility and Global 
Labor Justice, 12 J. POL. PHIL. 365 (2004); Iris Young, Responsibility and 
Global Justice: A Social Connection Model, 23 SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y 102 (2006). 
 418. See Hsieh, supra note 416, at 643. 
 419. See Wood, supra note 414.  
 420. See Bilchitz, supra note 414.  
 421. See Santoro, Profits and Principles, supra note 416, at 154–55 
(“[H]uman rights duties should be allocated according to three factors: 
relationship effectiveness, and capacity… When these three factors are taken 
into account, the duties that can be fairly allocated to come actors… are not 
only different from those assigned to other actors … but they may also be, as a 
practical matter, more onerous as well.”); Santoro, China 2020, supra note 
416, at 17 (describing the “fair share” theory of corporate human rights 
responsibilities).  
 422. Florian Wettstein, Beyond Voluntariness, Beyond CSR: Making a Case 
for Human Rights and Justice 114 BUS. & SOC’Y REV. 125 (2009). 
 423. Miller, supra note 415; Tom Campbell, supra note 298. 
 424. See HANS JONAS, THE IMPERATIVE OF RESPONSIBILITY: IN SEARCH OF 
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clout,425 or potential for effectuating positive influence.426 
In his writing of the recent Guiding Principles, Ruggie 
modified his former position opposing non-causal human rights 
responsibility.427 His modified position states:“The 
responsibility to respect human rights requires that business 
enterprises . . . Seek to prevent or mitigate adverse human 
rights impacts that are directly linked to their operations, 
products or services by their business relationships, even if they 
have not contributed to those impacts.”428  
Consequently, if corporate human rights responsibility is 
interpreted to advance farther than just the negative sphere of 
respecting human rights and to encompass positive features 
founded on power or influence, then a need arises to address 
the potential of a business case for corporations’ proactive 
engagement for the protection and realization of human rights. 
According to instrumentalist reasoning, corporations that 
passively respect and actively engage in the protection and 
realization of human rights might be positioned to earn 
goodwill from the public and customer bases, which could 
translate into economic benefits.429  
However, the question is what counts as “above and 
beyond” when it comes to corporations’ responsibilities in the 
protection and realization of human rights? If corporations 
have qualified positive human rights obligations and their 
obligations therefore extend beyond the negative realm of doing 
no harm, then the instrumental argument regarding those 
circumstances fails on the same conceptual grounds as was 
 
AN ETHICS FOR THE TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 92–93 (Univ. Chicago Press 1984); 
Stephen Kobrin, Private Political Authority and Public Responsibility: 
Transnational Politics, Transnational Firms and Human Rights, 19 BUS. 
ETHICS Q. 349, 350 (2009); Young, From Guilt to Solidarity. Sweatshops and 
Political Responsibility, supra note 417, at 43; Young, Responsibility and 
Global Labor Justice, supra note 417, at 381.  
 425. Wood, supra note 414. 
 426. See generally Santoro, supra note 416, at 143 (“If a corporation cannot 
make a positive impact by performing an action, then it makes little sense to 
say that it is morally required to do so.”). 
 427. U.N. Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Guiding 
Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations 
“Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework, U.N. DOC. A/HRC/17/31 (March 21, 
2011).  
 428. Id., ¶ 13 (emphasis added).  
 429. See generally O’Neill, supra note 376, at 50 n.25 (describing 
instrumental reasoning “such as the claim that those who seek some end 
must, if rational, seek or take what they believe to be a means that contributes 
to that end.”). 
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outlined in the preceding sections. 
Advancing an instrumental argument for human rights 
responsibilities of corporations is per se problematic. A more 
plausible option, therefore, is to base such responsibilities on 
non-instrumental moral grounds.430 This, however, implies an 
extension of corporate responsibility beyond the mere respect of 
human rights. As such, a non-instrumental moral alternative 
to the instrumental business case argument fundamentally 
challenges the UN Framework’s rigid division of responsibility 
between corporation and state. 
 
B. NON-INSTRUMENTAL JUSTIFICATIONS FOR HUMAN 
RIGHTS 
Standing alongside the notion of the rule of law as a non-
instrumental regulative ideal is the concept of human rights 
justifiable on non-instrumental moral grounds.  
 
1. Common Public Justification 
 In the context of collaborative governance régimes, there 
are various ways in which human rights figure into decision-
making. Two common forms of such justification are 
contractualist431 and functionalist432 approaches. The 
differences in approaches to human rights stem from 
alternative forms of justification. Such differences in justifying 
theories, in turn, significantly influencethe way that human 
rights are applied in specific situations where they compete 
with other standards.  
 
 430. See, e.g., Dennis Arnold, Transnational Corporations and the Duty to 
Respect Basic Human Rights, 20 BUS. ETHICS Q. 371 (2010); Cragg, supra note 
316.  
 431. See generally Griffin, supra note 398, at 78-79 (describing the narrow 
contractuarian justification as geared toward satisfying human rights 
specifically within frameworks shaped to meet the expectations of participants 
agreeing to a mutual exchange of commitments; criticizing the contractuarian 
justification’s inconsistency and fragmentation).  
 432. L. Amede Obiora, Reconstituted Consonants: The Reach of a “Common 
Core” Analogy in Human Rights, 21 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 921, 945 
(1998). A functionalist justification takes the particular purpose of an 
organization to establish the parameters of its moral responsibility vis à vis 
human rights. Whereas common public justification is expansive, functionalist 
justification is more narrowly circumscribed. An actor is seen to be responsible 
across a narrower spectrum of people, and with regard to each person it is 
responsible for a narrower slice of interests. As applied to for-profit 
corporations, a functionalist justificatory frame of reference endorses the 
traditional shareholder conception, whereby a firm’s interests are narrowly 
focused on the interests of its shareholders.  
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The form of justification of human rights most closely 
associated with the conception of rule of law that was 
elaborated in section one of this article is what may be termed 
common public justification.433 Compared to other forms of 
justification, this approach extends the widest scope and 
assigns the most substantial prima facie weighting to human 
rights. Human rights are taken to guide and constrain from 
abuses of power all varieties of actors that comprise civil 
society: governments, intergovernmental organizations, 
business enterprises, NGOs, private associations, and 
individuals. Their responsibility holds wherever they are 
situated, and attaches to local, national, and international 
levels of activity across all sectors.  
Within the frame of reference of a common public 
justification, responsibility extends to anyone that may be 
affected by actors’ conduct. The actor is responsible for taking 
into account all of the rights of those affected. This means, for 
example, that a company is responsible not just for respecting 
the human rights of its shareholders and employees, but also 
for respecting the human rights of its consumers, suppliers, 
and other stakeholders. Likewise, an intergovernmental 
organization is under the conception of public common 
justification, responsible not just for respecting the rights of 
manufacturers of member states that stand to gain when it 
fulfills its mandate in promoting global trade, but also for 
respecting other human rights of people impacted by goods and 
services in markets opened by those trade agreements. 
It is necessary to take into account the challenging 
interpretive matter of determining the proper scope of and also 
of balancing and weighting such rights when they conflict with 
each other and with other considerations.434 
 
2. Human Rights as Higher Law 
It has been known from antiquity that there exists a law 
higher than written human decrees.435 
 
 433. Meintjes, supra note 28, at 83. 
 434. JAMES W. NICKEL, MAKING SENSE OF HUMAN RIGHTS (Univ. of Cal. 
Press 1987). 
 435. SOPHOCLES, ANTIGONE, lines 453–57; WILLIAM EBENSTEIN, GREAT 
POLITICAL THINKERS: FROM PLATO TO THE PRESENT 133 (Harcourt College 
Publishers 2000) (quoting Marcus Tullius Cicero in the Republic: “There will 
not be different laws at Rome and at Athens, or different laws now and in the 
future, but one eternal and unchangeable law will be valid for all nations and 
all times.”).  
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The idea of an unseen higher law remains at the 
foundation of the modern concept of rights. John Locke 
maintained that even in a state of nature, there is a law 
recognized by all people which is implanted in human 
reason.436 Such a law of nature engenders natural rights 
discernible by all rational beings.437 Such a conception 
designates rights that are taken to be independent of and prior 
to rights established by particular political arrangements.  
In the realm of international law, the notion of an 
unwritten higher law has been vital. For instance, during the 
Nazi war crimes trials at Nuremberg, jurisdictional limitations 
precluded prosecuting the crimes pursuant to the laws of the 
various participating nation-states.438 Accordingly, the 
indictments referenced “crimes against humanity.”439 
Recourse to the idea of a higher moral law has been central 
to many civil rights cases throughout American history. Martin 
Luther King, Jr.’s famous “Letter from Birmingham Jail” 
decried the persistence of racial prejudice from extant law:  
A just law is a man-made code that squares with 
the moral law, or the law of God. An unjust law 
is a code that is out of harmony with the moral 
law. To put it in the terms of St. Thomas 
Aquinas, an unjust law is a human law that is 
not rooted in eternal law and natural law.440 
For Aquinas, natural law is that part of the eternal law of 
the Creator that is presented to human reason.441 Society is 
guided by a rational apprehension of the eternal law which is 
 
 436. See generally O’Neill, supra note 376, at 140 (“Locke …[began] not 
with rights but with Natural Law or duty, and discuss[ed] justice and virtue in 
tandem.”). 
 437. See, e.g., THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, para. 2 (U.S. 1776) 
(“We hold these truths to be self-evident: that all men are created equal; that 
they are endowed, by their Creator, with certain unalienable rights; that 
among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.”). 
 438. See generally Philippe Kirsch, Applying the Principles of Nuremburg 
in the International Criminal Court, 6 WASH. U. GLOB. STUD. L. REV. 501, 504 
(2007) (stating that the Nuremburg courts only had jurisdiction over crimes 
against humanity, war crimes, and crimes against the peace). 
 439. WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, GENOCIDE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE CRIME 
OF CRIMES (Cambridge Univ. Press 2009). 
 440. Martin Luther King, Jr., “Letter From a Birmingham Jail,” (Apr. 16, 
1963); THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA, I-II Q. 95, art. 2 (“[E]very 
human law has just so much of the nature of law, as it is derived from the law 
of nature. But if in any point it deflects from the law of nature, it is no longer a 
law but a perversion of law.”).  
 441. Griffin, supra note 398, at 9. 
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imprinted as precepts, rules of behavior, or broad principles of 
natural law.442 Because humans are autonomous beings, they 
must choose to observe the law of nature through their own 
acts of free will.443 Natural law is a product of unaided 
reason.444 Human laws are positive laws that are, or should be, 
derived from natural law.445 It is the correlation between 
higher unwritten law and written norms, such as those 
constituting public international law and human rights, that 
establishes the moral legitimacy of those written norms.446 
The normative principles of human rights connected to 
fundamental aspects of human well-being guide practical 
reason.447 They also inform moral deliberation about how 
people, governments, business enterprises, and other 
organizations should act.448 Logically speaking, such 
foundational principles of practical reflection entail norms that 
lead elements of society to pursue some options, while requiring 
that others be abandoned.449 Drawing upon a conception of a 
higher moral law provides a means of calling attention to 
objective principles of right action for business.  
Both the concept of human rights and the notion of the rule 
of law are ultimately moral ideas. Despite the inclinations of 
some people toward ethical relativism, these ideas are 
grounded in objective morality. They both insist that there are 
limits on the ways in which governments, business enterprises, 
and individuals can pursue their chosen objectives. 
 
 442. Id. 
 443. EDWARD W. YOUNKINS, CHAMPIONS OF A FREE SOCIETY: IDEAS OF 
CAPITALISM’S PHILOSOPHERS AND ECONOMISISTS 72 (Lexington Books 2008) 
(“Because men are autonomous beings they must choose to observe the law of 
nature through acts of free will.”).  
 444. Id. 
 445. Aquinas, supra note 440 (“Now both these conditions are verified of 
human law: since it is both something ordained to an end; and is a rule or 
measure ruled or measured by a higher measure. And this higher measure is 
twofold, viz. the Divine law and the natural law.”). 
 446. See, e.g., David Jenkins, From Unwritten to Written: Transformation 
in the British Common-Law Constitution, 36 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 863, 931 
(2003). 
 447. For a general discussion of the normative and theoretical foundations 
of human rights, see HUMAN RIGHTS: POLITICS AND PRACTICE 11–25 (Michael 
Goodhart ed., Oxford Univ. Press 2009). 
 448. See, e.g., Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: 
Implementing the United Nations “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework, 
supra note 427, para. 14.  
 449. O’Neill, supra note 376, at 36 (“Actual norms and traditions … can 
indeed guide action.”). 
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Some would argue that using human rights language to 
account for broad moral principles of corporate governance is 
unnecessary.450 While it may not be absolutely necessary to 
employ the vocabulary of rights, it seems reasonable and 
efficacious to do so. One properly speaks of an employee’s right 
to not be discriminated against by her company on the basis of 
her gender.451 One can accurately describe a garment 
subcontractor’s trafficking in human slavery as a violation of 
human rights.452 All individuals, from whatever communities 
they are drawn, are bound to respect these human rights 
because of their virtue for humanity rather than because of the 
individuals’ membership in a particular domestic or 
international legal order.453 
As Aristotle and other thinkers have endeavored to show, 
the nature of human beings is rational.454 It is with regard to 
distinctive human nature that people are endowed with a 
profound, robust, and inherent moral agency, equality, and 
dignity. Each of these ideas is considered below. 
 
3. Agency 
As rational agents, human beings are uniquely equipped to 
make choices and decisions that are illuminated by moral 
deliberation.455 Because of this, human beings are rightly held 
accountable for their choices and conduct.456  
Exercising moral agency mandates that human beings 
have freedom to make choices consistent with values of their 
free choice.457 In other words, moral agency bestows moral 
autonomy, the ability to make decisions predicated on moral 
 
 450. Jackson, supra note 85, at 150. 
 451. See SWARN LATA SHARMA, GENDER DISCIMINATION AND HUMAN 
RIGHTS 60–62 (K.K. Publications 2000). 
 452. See generally ANJA SEIBERT-FOHR, PROSECUTING SERIOUS HUMAN 
RIGHTS VIOLATIONS 186 (Oxford Univ. Press 2009). 
 453. See generally Griffin, supra note 398, at 101 (implying that human 
rights impose universal duties by referring to them as “doubly universal”). 
 454. See generally, ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, Book 1, Chapter 7. 
 455. See J. N. Hooker, Moral Implications of Rational Choice Theories (July 
2011), available at http://ba.gsia.cmu.edu/jnh/rationalChoiceTheoriesPost.pdf.  
 456. James Griffin, Human Rights: Whose Duties?, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND 
THE MORAL RESPONSIBILITIES OF CORPORATE AND PUBLIC SECTOR 
ORGANISATIONS 31, 31-43 (Tom Campbell & Seumas Miller eds., Kluwer 
2004). 
 457. ALAN GEWIRTH, THE COMMUNITY OF RIGHTS 6, 13 (Univ. Chi. Press 
1996); ALAN GEWIRTH, REASONS AND MORALITY 30–32 (Univ. Chi. Press 
1978). 
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reflection. 
Without the freedom required by choice, moral agency is 
impeded. Carving out space in which moral agency can take 
shape is a primary human interest and a central moral value. 
Making sure that moral agents are free from arbitrary 
constraint that would inhibit the exercise of moral agency is an 
important moral objective. Society needs human rights to 
shield the freedom necessary to pursue chosen goals.458 This is 
a universal human need shared equally by all. Human rights 
values and principles thereby define and protect interests that 
all humans share.459  
 
4. Equality 
Moral agency is something that all humans have in 
common, and what all humans need to exercise their agency is 
equally shared.460 Moral equality stems from humans’ ability to 
deliberate and choose how they want to live. Disregarding the 
fact that as moral agents all humans are created equal leads to 
impositions of arbitrary constraints inhibiting the ability of 
people to lead lives of their own choice. This amounts to a form 
of unfair discrimination against them.461 The impact of 
discrimination is to arbitrarily constrain the ability of those 
discriminated against to direct their lives as they choose.462 
There is a strong linkage between the regulative idea of human 
rights with the regulative idea of the rule of law: both ideas are 
squarely opposed to morally arbitrary conduct towards human 
beings. 
 
5. Dignity 
The logic of moral agency implies dignity.463 Moral agency 
carries no value unless people are free to express what that 
agency confers.464 To recognize autonomy means treating those 
 
 458. See, e.g., Preamble to Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities 
Act, No. 43/2006 (Victoria 2006).  
 459. Gewirth, THE COMMUNITY OF RIGHTS, supra note 457, at 9.  
 460. Griffin, supra note 398, at 32–33 (discussing the nature of human 
agency). 
 461. Id. at 33 (“[O]thers must not forcibly stop one from pursuing what one 
sees as a worthwhile life.”). 
 462. Id. 
 463. See Griffin, supra note 456, at 31–33 (discussing the connection 
between human rights and dignity). 
 464. See Garth Kemerling, Kant: The Moral Order, PHILOSOPHY PAGES, 
http://www.philosophypages.com/hy/5i.htm (last modified Nov. 12, 2011).  
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whose freedom and autonomy is respected with dignity.465 
Owing to people’s shared status as moral agents able to orient 
their lives in line with values of their own choosing, people are 
all equally worthy of being extended respect and dignity.466 
 
6. Intrinsic Versus Instrumental Value of Human Rights 
Human rights carry instrumental and intrinsic value in 
the sense that their respect paves a path of freedom that lets 
people do things they otherwise could not do.467 Respect for 
human rights guarantees equal and fair access to education, 
employment, medical care, and recreation.468 Human rights 
establish an economic, legal, political, and social atmosphere in 
which people can live by values of their own choice unhampered 
by arbitrary barriers. Thus people all have the same interest in 
making sure human rights are secured.  
Human rights are intrinsically valuable because they 
affirm that people are equal in moral status to one another and 
worthy of equal treatment on all matters bearing on their 
capacity to exercise moral judgment. 
 
7. Protecting Human Rights within Global Economic 
Governance Schemes 
Respecting human rights does not necessitate 
institutionalizing them solely through “hard” international law 
backed up by formal enforcement.469 There is no inherent 
contradiction in proposing decentralized, informal 
arrangements wherein values upon which human rights are 
based (freedom, equality, and dignity) are entrenched in 
transnational governance syndicates in ways that do not 
trigger traditional coercive and centralized modes of formal 
protection. 
Concerning the responsibility of participants in 
transnational governance régimes, whether corporations, 
 
 465. Steven Pinker, The Stupidity of Dignity, THE NEW REPUBLIC (May 28, 
2008), http://pinker.wjh.harvard.edu/articles/media/ 
The%20Stupidity%20of%20Dignity.htm (arguing that dignity is merely 
another application of the principle of autonomy).  
 466. See Griffin, supra note 456, at 31–33. 
 467. O’Neill¸ supra note 376, at 188 (discussing instrumental justifications 
for human rights). 
 468. See, e.g., International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 entered into force Jan. 3, 1976. 
 469. Donnelly, supra note 398, at 164–166 (discussing the choice of means 
of enforcing international human rights objectives). 
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NGOs, governments, or civil society actors, it is at the point 
where some protection, formal or informal, is called for that the 
obligation to extend protective efforts arise.470 For this to come 
about, a right must be ensconced in some system of norms.471 
Whereas previously it was normally supposed that such a 
system of norms could only take the form of formal rules 
promulgated and enforced by states, either in a “vertical” 
fashion in relation to their own citizens or in a “horizontal” 
fashion in relation to members of the international community 
at large, today’s global governance through “soft law” provides 
alternative configurations for systematizing norms for human 
rights.472  
Because human rights safeguard core and overriding moral 
values and institutionalize their respect, protection and 
promotion are priorities not only for nation-states but also for 
economic actors at national and international levels. It follows 
that where the ability to directly advance respect for human 
rights and where the ability to indirectly secure or assist in 
securing their respect exists, there exists also an obligation to 
do so. Because institutionalizing respect for human rights is so 
basic, where the ability to institutionalize that respect exists, 
exerting that ability is also a primary moral obligation. 
The purpose of human rights is at root in harmony with 
the purpose of the rule of law, properly understood as 
establishing conditions under which human dignity, freedom, 
and equality will flourish.473 Far from what might be supposed 
from the seemingly “voluntary” character of many 
commitments to global civil regulations by business 
enterprises, the obligations flowing from the existence of 
human rights are not voluntary. Where they are in jeopardy, 
human rights must be entrenched not only in centralized and 
formal coercive systems of “hard” rules of international law, but 
 
 470. Contra Luke Glanville, The Responsibility to Protect Beyond Borders, 
12:1 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 1, 31 (2012) (asserting that “every state with the 
capacity to effectively influence genocidal actors has an obligation to take all 
means reasonably available to prevent genocide as soon as they become aware 
of a serious risk that the crime will be committed.”).  
 471. Kevin Jackson, Normative Systemization for Integrating Human 
Rights Into International Business, 78 ARCHIV FUR RECHTS UND 
SOZIALPHILOSOPHIE 111, 112 (2001). 
 472. Donnelly, supra note 398, at 164–166 (discussing the choice of means 
of enforcing international human rights objectives). 
 473. Id. at 166–68 (discussing the purposes of international human rights 
policies). 
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even more importantly in decentralized and informal systems 
of “soft” norms of economic governance régimes. Regardless, the 
rule of law ideal which underwrites these respective normative 
systems demands that the norms be binding and overriding in 
their essential characters.  
It is impossible to provide definitive resolution for what is 
a permanent issue of disputation: the precise scope and extent 
of human rights obligations for business.474 It can, however, be 
said with certainty that a shift is occurring away from the view 
that states are the only actors having binding obligations to 
honor and preserve the human rights of global citizens.475 As 
well, it is widely acknowledged that business enterprises have 
an obligation to obey international law in its variant forms, 
both traditional and emergent.476 Because human rights go to 
the very heart of the international rule of law, it follows that 
corporations shoulder responsibilities for upholding such 
standards. Moreover, as stated in the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, a widespread responsibility rests with all 
people and all components of society to uphold respect for 
human rights.477  
Because corporations, intergovernmental organizations, 
and organs of civil society have human rights obligations, their 
allegiance to the international rule of law will mandate a 
commitment to institutionalization of human rights practices 
 
 474. For treatment of this issue, see HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE MORAL 
RESPONSIBILITIES OF CORPORATE AND PUBLIC SECTOR ORGANISATIONS (Tom 
Campbell & Seumas Miller eds., 2004).  
 475. See David Horton, Illuminating the Path of Aliens’ Judicial Recourse: 
Preventing Another Bowoto v. Chevron by Congressional Legislation, 10:1 
APPALACHIAN J. L. 27, 45 (2010) (asserting that the passage of the Bowoto 
Alien Tort Claims Against American Corporations Extracting Natural 
Resource Act of 2009 “could essentially transform multinational corporations 
into responsible members of the community by forcing them to show a 
commitment to human rights, or else be sued.”).  
 476. See, e.g., Larry Cata Backer, From Institutional Misalignments to 
Socially Sustainable Governance: The Guiding Principles for the 
Implementation of the United Nations’ “Protect, Respect and Remedy” and the 
Construction of Inter-Systemic Global Governance 107 (2012), available at 
http://www.mcgeorge.edu/Documents/Conferences/GlobeJune2012_FromInstit
utionalMisalignments.pdf.  
 477. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res 217 (III) A, U.N. 
Doc. A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948) (“[A]s a common standard of achievement 
for all peoples and all nations, to the end that every individual and every 
organ of society, keeping this Declaration constantly in mind, shall strive by 
teaching and education to promote respect for these rights and freedoms and 
by progressive measures, national and international, to secure their universal 
and effective recognition and observance.”).  
JACKSON - Global Economic Governance (22 MINN J INTL L 71 (Winter 2013)) 2/21/2013  1:48 PM 
2013] GLOBAL ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE 147 
 
and principles to the extent they are capable of doing so. 
 
8. Impacting Public Discussion and Deliberation 
Following from the principle that with power comes 
responsibility,478 the collaborative power of economic actors 
should be channeled to shape public policy to foster fulfillment 
of human rights obligations. Corporations should encourage 
governments with whom they engage and interact to fulfill 
their obligations under the rule of law, especially in connection 
with institutionalizing protection for human rights. This 
obligation must of necessity mean support for implanting in 
institutional frameworks the requirement that NGOs, IGOs, 
and companies themselves respect and protect human rights 
wherever they are doing business. 
In line with the rule of law’s opposition to arbitrary 
exercise of power, this should not be conceived of as a merely 
discretionary obligation.479 The obligation exists whether acted 
on or not. However, it is clear that by its very nature the 
obligation must be self-imposed and in that sense voluntary. It 
is not an obligation that can be imposed exclusively by means 
of “hard” international legal instrumentalities, even though 
hard law can be deployed, for example, to delimit the power of 
corporations to influence public policy by imposing restrictions 
on advertising and by curbing contributions to political parties 
and candidates.  
Especially in developing and underdeveloped regions of the 
globe, the activities of corporations may exert more direct 
bearing on overall human well-being than their populations’ 
respective governments.480 Even where strong and stable 
government is the order of the day, corporations, with their 
financial resources and access to technology and science, are 
equipped to produce products whose potential impacts 
governments do not have the wherewithal to assess and 
 
 478. Keith Davis, Can Business Afford to Ignore Social Responsibilities? 2 
CAL. MGMT. REV. 70 (1960). 
 479. Waddock & Smith, supra note 393, at 47–62 (“Too much of the time, 
when we think about . . . corporate responsibility, we think about it as a 
discretionary responsibility.”). 
 480. Corporate Accountability, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, 
http://www.amnesty.org/en/campaigns/demand-dignity/issues/corporations-
human-rights-and-poverty (last visited Oct. 11, 2012) (“Yet all too often, 
human rights are abused as corporations exploit weak and poorly enforced 
domestic regulation and the lack of international accountability mechanisms 
to devastating effect in developing countries.”).  
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regulate.481 So too, in international counsels, corporate access 
to knowledge and information with its implications for 
economic development makes corporate involvement in shaping 
international policies and institutions manifest. 
 
9. Responsibility for Institutionalization 
Referring back to the idea of international rule of law 
developed over the course of this article, the 
institutionalization of human rights protections under the 
guidance of rule of law requires several things. It must be 
possible in theory and practice to implant human rights 
protections in the form of rules or principles that carry a 
reasonable measure of clarity and definitiveness in business 
management systems. Pursuant to the rule of law demand for 
publicity, implementations of the rules must be monitored to 
ascertain compliance and findings transmitted in publicly 
accessible documents. Pursuant to the rule of law demand for 
transparency, the reports must be subject to verification. 
Unless these conditions are met, it is not possible to establish 
whether respect for the rights in question has been 
institutionalized and whether a business enterprise’s human 
rights obligations are being satisfied. 
As was illustrated in the overview section on global 
governance régimes, there is evidence that a groundwork upon 
which many of these conditions may be established already 
exists in one form or another.482 Management systems are 
being developed and refined to allow training, monitoring, 
reporting and auditing.483 The Global Reporting Initiative has 
developed reasonably transparent monitoring and reporting 
systems.484 AccountAbility, Social Accountability International, 
Transparency International, and other public, private, and 
 
 481. Harold James, The Ethics of Business Life; Some Historical 
Reflections, in RETHINKING BUSINESS MANAGEMENT 19 (James R. Stoner, Jr. 
& Samuel Gregg eds., Witherspoon Inst. 2008). 
 482. See, e.g., Grant & Keohane, supra note 153 (addressing hard law 
forms of accountability); Keohane, supra note 167 (discussing soft law forms of 
accountability).  
 483. See Reporting Framework Overview, GLOBAL REPORTING INITIATIVE, 
https://www.globalreporting.org/reporting/reporting-framework-
overview/Pages/default.aspx (last visited Oct. 4, 2012); see, e.g., About SAI, 
SOCIAL ACCOUNTABILITY INTERNATIONAL, http://www.sa-intl.org/ 
index.cfm?fuseaction=Page.viewPage&pageId=472 (last visited Oct. 4, 2012). 
 484. See Reporting Framework Overview, GLOBAL REPORTING INITIATIVE, 
https://www.globalreporting.org/reporting/reporting-framework-
overview/Pages/default.aspx (last visited Oct. 4, 2012).  
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voluntary sector organizations are creating sophisticated 
management systems for infusing ethical standards into 
organizations and for monitoring, reporting and auditing the 
implementation of such standards.485 Access to these systems 
and training programs means that companies today are able to 
institutionalize protection of human rights in their operations. 
Still needed, however, is acknowledgement that the 
obligation to institutionalize protection for human rights 
expands beyond nation-states to private companies and the 
host of institutions and organizations playing a part in 
governing how business is conducted globally. It has been 
argued that, first, power bestows responsibility and second, 
that such power also draws into the transnational governance 
equation the fundamental requirements of the rule of law. Both 
of these moral principles attach not only to states but also to 
private sector, for-profit enterprises, and other global 
participants. 
 
III. CONCLUSION 
Global economic governance régimes today presuppose the 
rule of law as a regulative ideal and human rights as non-
instrumental moral principles. Although the rule of law is not 
an all-or-nothing concept, the regulative ideal requires that 
global governance institutions should manifest the antithesis of 
any arbitrary exercise of power and should strive to embody 
reasonable degrees of certainty, coherence, and transparency. 
Regarding human rights, the regulative ideal requires that 
participants in governance régimes strive to institutionalize 
respect and protection for such rights.  
On the regulative conception, any conflicts or apparent 
contradictions uncovered by skeptics will serve as incentives for 
renewed efforts in pursuit of the rule of law. The rule of law, 
properly understood as a regulative ideal, remains regardless of 
the directions taken by power politics and international 
relations. 
Understanding the international rule of law as a regulative 
ideal means that the contradictions and conflicts addressed by 
skeptics regarding law and new governance initiatives serve 
not as justification for across-the-board nihilism, but instead as 
a rallying call for renewed efforts in pursuit of realizing the 
 
 485. See, e.g., About SAI, SOCIAL ACCOUNTABILITY INTERNATIONAL, 
http://www.sa-intl.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=Page.viewPage&pageId=472 (last 
visited Oct. 4, 2012).  
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moral idea of rule of law in international economic relations. 
It makes sense both from theoretical and practical 
perspectives to orient one’s thinking about global economic 
governance with a focus on the rule of law and human rights. 
In the context of a rapidly globalizing economy, the justification 
of responsible business conduct across borders and cultures is 
more and more becoming a pressing practical concern. Within 
such a landscape, the universal foundations of the rule of law 
and human rights render them precious normative ideals given 
the ongoing struggles to identify a common ground amongst the 
different legal, cultural and moral traditions in the world 
today. 
This article has argued that the non-instrumental and 
universal justifiability of human rights and the rule of law 
provide a more stable epistemological platform for global 
economic governance than instrumental approaches are able to 
provide. Although disagreements persist concerning the precise 
scope and weight to be accorded to human rights in particular 
cases, the status of human rights as an objective moral ideal 
provides a basis upon which practical discussion of global 
responsibilities is made possible. This is especially crucial to 
debates about the shared responsibilities of participants in 
global governance initiatives. It makes sense for nation-states, 
intergovernmental organizations, and transnational 
corporations to invoke the discourse of rule of law and human 
rights when deliberating their joint and several 
responsibilities. After all, the demand for universal justification 
both empowers and constrains corresponding legal and moral 
obligations of economic actors on the international stage. 
Humans possess the ability to learn and to change their 
basic operating assumptions when necessity and logic call for 
it. Through their trust in the authority of moral ideals and the 
will for change, it is possible to move toward a world that takes 
the non-instrumental moral character of international human 
rights seriously. Even though attaining a complete realization 
of the ideal of a cosmopolitan world order committed to the rule 
of law “always remains a pious wish, still we are certainly not 
deceiving ourselves in adopting the maxim of working 
incessantly towards it.”486 Advancement of global economic 
governance régimes toward a closer approximation of the ideals 
of rule of law and human rights is surely preferable to ceding 
 
 486. Kant, supra note 376, at 161. 
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affairs to domination by partisan interests of power players in a 
world order adverse to such ideals. 
